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Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm
Angélica Cházaro
AbstrACt
Deportation of so-called “criminal aliens” has become the driving force in U.S. 
immigration enforcement.  The Immigration Accountability Executive Actions of 
late 2014 provide the most recent example of this trend.  Even for immigrants’ rights 
advocates, conventional wisdom holds that if deportations must occur, “criminal aliens” 
should be the first to go.  A voluminous “crimmigration” scholarship notes the ever-
growing entwinement of criminal and immigration enforcement, but does not challenge 
this fundamental premise.
This Article calls for a rejection of the formulation of the “criminal alien”—the figure 
used to increasingly justify the preservation and expansion of a harmful immigration 
regime.  It thus defends a normative claim that is starkly at odds with settled assumptions 
in advocacy and the literature: Deportations should not be distributed along the lines of 
migrant criminality.  As a consequence, this Article argues that scholarship and advocacy 
should embrace “criminal aliens” as the priority group to defend against immigration 
enforcement efforts.
This move is long overdue.  Across the political spectrum, calls are being made to trim 
back the excesses of the criminal justice system, with both policing and incarceration 
practices suffering from crises of legitimacy.  Yet the immigration system continues 
to layer the shortcomings and dysfunctions of the criminal justice system onto 
immigration enforcement efforts.  The latest immigration reform effort, in the form 
of the Immigration Accountability Executive Actions, refines what it means to be a 
“criminal alien,” thereby expanding partnerships with the criminal justice system and 
creating stronger nets of social control over broad swaths of the noncitizen population. 
While offering the possibility of relief from deportation to part of the undocumented 
population, the Executive Actions ultimately do not curb deportations.  Rather, the 
programs refocus enforcement efforts on an ideologically acceptable target: the “criminal 
alien.”  To avoid this outcome, and to begin to dismantle immigrant vulnerability, the 
“criminal alien” paradigm must be challenged.
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INTRODUCTION 
On November 20, 2014, after months of delays, President Obama an-
nounced the “Immigration Accountability Executive Actions,” a series of admin-
istrative reforms to the immigration system.  These reforms included expanded 
protections from deportations—in the form of renewable “deferred action”1—
for certain segments of the unauthorized migrant population.2  The response 
was swift and immediate.  Opponents decried the “imperial presidency” and 
denounced the action as “executive amnesty.”3  Immigrants and their supporters 
celebrated the expansion of protection but criticized the President for not going 
far enough.4 
  
1. See infra Part I.C for a full discussion of the deferred action programs created by the Executive. 
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration 
(Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-addr 
ess-nation-immigration [http://perma.cc/RUQ8-4VSN]. 
3. Eli Saslow, Conservative Expert on Immigration Law to Pursue Suit Against Executive Action, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2014/11/22/f6d2b3fe-728a-
11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html [http://perma.cc/R63B-FN3Z] (describing Kansas Secretary 
of State Kris Kobach characterizing the executive action as “[i]mperial, executive amnesty,” and 
“[t]he sacrificial shredding of our Constitution.”); see also Ross Douthat, The Making of an Imperial 
President, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/opinion/sunday/ 
ross-douthat-the-making-of-an-imperial-president.html [http://perma.cc/PB4B-6PEH] (claiming 
that the Obama Administration has become the type of imperial executive President Obama decried 
during his campaign). 
4. See, e.g., Gustavo Bonilla, Obama’s Executive Order on Immigration May Not Go Far Enough for 
My Family, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/20 
14/nov/20/obamas-executive-order-on-immigration-not-far-enough [http://perma.cc/67T9-K 
ZUM] (arguing that the announced Executive Actions on Immigration will not counteract 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deadlines for deportation and voluntary 
removal); see also Tim Gaynor, Relief or tears as Obama’s reform touch Arizona immigrant families, 
ALJAZEERA AM. (Nov. 21, 2014). http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/11/21/obama-imm 
igrationarizon awatchpartyreaction. html [http://perma.cc/2YER-8U9D] (“We were really, really 
hopeful that everyone was going to benefit from this and unfortunately that’s not the case.”); 
Michael Larkin & John Cádiz Klemack, SoCal Undocumented Immigrants Say Obama’s Immigration 
Overhaul Does Not Go Far Enough, NBC L.A. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/ 
news/local/SoCal-Undocumented-Immigrants-Say-President-Obamas-Immigration-Overhaul-
Does-Not-Go-Far-Enough-283457871.html [http://perma.cc/B45Z-343P] (describing the 
disappointment of undocumented parents and children that, even with the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) executive action in place, they are “still at risk to be deported”); 
Michael D. Shear, Obama, Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 
2014),  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/obama-immigration-speech.html [http://perma. 
cc/G6MD-4VT4] (“Immigration advocates and the president’s Democratic allies hailed the 
announcement even as they insisted that more should be done to provide legal protections for 
millions of unauthorized immigrants unaffected by Mr. Obama’s directives.”). 
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Nestled in one of the eleven memoranda simultaneously released by the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that established the 
parameters of the Executive Actions5 was the “significant misdemeanor,” a cate-
gory of criminal offenses established as one of the new priorities for immigra-
tion enforcement efforts.6  It transforms noncitizens convicted of a series of 
petty offenses, including a single driving under the influence (DUI), into so-called 
“criminal aliens,”7 and directs immigration enforcement agencies to prioritize 
their arrest, imprisonment, and deportation8 (formally known as removal).9 
The inclusion of the significant misdemeanor in the Executive Actions as 
a mechanism for facilitating deportations represents just one of the latest mani-
festations in a growing trend: deportation of “criminal aliens” as the driving force in 
U.S. immigration enforcement.10  The contents of the Executive Actions reflect 
the broadly accepted wisdom that, if deportations must occur, “criminal aliens” 
should be the first to go.11  Thus, the Executive Actions form part and parcel of the 
constant growth of immigration-related practices and activities that can be catego-
rized as criminal.12  Even immigration scholars who have carefully and insightfully 
  
5. See U.S. DEP’T. HOMELAND SEC., FIXING OUR BROKEN IMMIGRATION SYSTEM THROUGH 
EXECUTIVE ACTION—KEY FACTS, (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action 
[http://perma.cc/REK7-4CTH]. 
6. See Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. 
Winkowski, Acting Dir. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. 
Customs & Border Prot., Leon Rodriguez, Dir. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Alan D. 
Bersin, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Pol'y 4 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [http://perma.cc/RCY5-6VGF] 
[hereinafter Priorities Memo]; infra Part I.A for a full discussion of the significant misdemeanor. 
7. Throughout the text, I will use the term "criminal alien" in quotes, unless I am referring to the 
criminal alien category.  The Article seeks to problematize the unquestioning use of the concept 
of the "criminal alien" to guide immigration law and policy, and the use of quotes contributes to 
that goal.  
8. I will use the colloquial term “deportation” throughout the Article to refer to the process of removal.  
Removal is the legal term for the formal expulsion of a noncitizen from the United States when the 
noncitizen has been found removable for violating the immigration laws.  Prior to 1997 deportation 
and exclusion were separate removal procedures.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration 
Responsibility Act consolidated these procedures into one removal function.  Deportation continues 
to be used outside the immigration legal context to refer to removal, and I adopt that term 
throughout. 
9. Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 2. 
10. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1128 (2013). 
11. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, supra note 2 (“That’s why, over the past six years, deportations of 
criminals are up 80 percent.  And that’s why we’re going to keep focusing enforcement resources on 
actual threats to our security.  Felons, not families.  Criminals, not children.  Gang members, not a 
mom who’s working hard to provide for her kids.  We’ll prioritize, just like law enforcement does 
every day.”). 
12. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal 
Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (arguing that the “theories, methods, 
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dissected the links between the criminal and immigration system stop short of 
making the normative claim that deportations should not be distributed along the 
lines of migrant criminality.13  Kevin R. Johnson’s insight that “the ‘criminal alien’ 
continues to be one of the most reviled characters of all of U.S. law, with many en-
emies and extremely few political friends (even among immigrant rights advo-
cates),” continues to ring true.14 
This Article challenges the accepted wisdom, arguing for the necessity of 
dismantling the category of criminal alien as a vector for the harms of immigration 
enforcement.  It does so by analyzing the 2014 Immigration Accountability Exec-
utive Actions, positing that the actions represent neither the amnesty decried by 
critics nor the curb to deportations hoped for by advocates.  Instead, by widening 
who is considered a “criminal alien,” the Executive Actions represent a moment of 
expansion and consolidation of harmful systems targeting immigrant communi-
ties. 
The fact that the deportation of “criminal aliens” has become the driving 
force in U.S. immigration enforcement has led at least one scholar to declare fed-
eral immigration enforcement a “criminal removal system.”15  This system requires 
the constant production of populations who can be labeled “criminal aliens” and 
thus be justifiably arrested, detained, and deported.  Given its reliance on the crim-
inal system, this production of “criminal aliens” occurs along lines of race,16 class,17 
and other vectors of social vulnerability.18  This places immigration enforcement 
  
perceptions, and priorities” of the criminal justice system have been incorporated into the immigration 
enforcement system). 
13. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
613, 614 (2013) (tracking major developments in immigration law and immigration enforcement 
that have led to criminalization of immigrants); Legomsky, supra note 12, at 469 (arguing that the 
“theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities” of the criminal justice system have been incorporated 
into the immigration enforcement system.); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent 
Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003) (describing the 
criminalization of immigration law through law enforcement-focused reforms). 
14. Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 
55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599, 1607 (2009). 
15. See Eagly, supra note 10, at 1128. 
16. See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1543, 1549 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio and United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce effectively enables procedural racial profiling); see also Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last 
Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 
(1998) (analyzing the Plenary Power Doctrine and its application against Asian and African 
Americans). 
17. See Yolanda Vásquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the 
Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639, 666–67 (2011). 
18. See Pooja Gehi, Gendered (In)security: Migration and Criminalization in the Security State, 35 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 357, 385 (2012) (analyzing Secure Communities (S-Comm)’s disparate impact on 
queer and transgender undocumented communities). 
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firmly in line with the practices and activities of the criminal justice system.19  
This Article examines the Executive Actions in this light, revealing them as part 
of a broader thrust not to curb detentions and deportations, but to redirect them 
toward a more ideologically acceptable set of targets: so-called “criminal aliens.” 
The ongoing legal battle over whether certain parts of the Executive Actions 
will be implemented only serves to mask the preservation of practices that lead to 
record levels of immigration enforcement.  The possible extension of deferred ac-
tion (protection from deportation) to unauthorized migrants who arrived in the 
United States as children, and to unauthorized migrant who are parents of U.S. 
citizens (the two categories included in the Executive Actions’ protections), is cur-
rently being contested in the courts.  Twenty-six states sued to stop its implemen-
tation,20 and the Obama Administration and immigrant advocates are strenuously 
defending it.21  This legal battle, which falls primarily on partisan lines, obscures 
the fact that expanding deferred action would not lead to a corresponding decrease 
in deportations.  If deferred action is ultimately implemented, those who do not 
qualify for its protections will receive the full brunt of DHS’s immigration en-
forcement efforts.  The legal battle also ignores that, if deferred action is imple-
mented, the capture of applicants’ biometrics data and the permanent storage of 
this data in the immigration database relied upon by DHS’s enforcement agencies 
to apprehend, detain, and deport those who come into contact with the criminal 
system would mark deferred action applicants as “criminal aliens”-in-waiting.22  
Thus, even recipients of deferred action would be only one police stop away from 
being labeled “criminal aliens,” targeted for immigration enforcement practices. 
This Article seeks to unmask these practices and examine how the United 
States has reduced the response to the social crisis of unauthorized migration to 
the logics of criminality and expulsion.  These logics are grounded in narratives 
that pit worthy (hardworking, family-oriented) immigrants against unworthy 
(criminal alien) immigrants.23  The President’s insistence that the Executive Ac-
  
19. See Mary Bosworth & Emma Kaufman, Foreigners in a Carceral Age: Immigration and Imprisonment 
in the United States, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 429 (2011). 
20. Order of Temporary Injunction, Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/255992850/Order-of-Temporary-Injunction-Texas-v-United-States 
(order granting temporary injunction of implementation of executive action). 
21. See Katie Zezima, Obama: ‘We Will Be as Aggressive as We Can’ on Immigration Appeal, WASH. 
POST. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/02/25/oba 
ma-meets-with-immigration-activists-ahead-of-florida-town-hall [http://perma.cc/PRX7L9WG] 
(advocates and President Obama prepare to “aggressively” defend the new deferred action program 
enjoined by the Texas District Court). 
22. See infra Part I.C for a full discussion of the biometrics requirement and its possible consequences. 
23. See Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 14 
NEV. L.J. 101, 112 (2013). 
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tions seek to target immigration enforcement against “felons, not families” plac-
es it squarely within these narratives.24  By playing into these false binaries, the 
Executive Actions appear designed to teach us how to abandon entire popula-
tions through consolidating and strengthening of the criminal alien category.25 
This Article proposes new terms of engagement, building on, but depart-
ing from, the existing literature on the intersections of criminal and immigration 
law and policy.  It builds on scholarship addressing the shortcomings of the 
criminal justice system, arguing that any attempt to avoid further consolidation 
of the criminal alien category requires an engagement with the crisis of legitima-
cy currently facing the criminal system.  While many have used the language of 
“collateral consequences” to acknowledge the disparate impact on those persons 
caught between the criminal and immigration regimes,26 this Article engages 
with the way the dysfunctions of the criminal system are overlaid on the immi-
gration system to create cumulative consequences for those whose identity 
marks them as both criminal and alien. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I analyzes three of the Executive 
Actions memoranda released on November 20, 2014.27  It argues that the 
memorandum entitled, “Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Remov-
al of Undocumented Immigrants” (Priorities Memo), which redefined what 
segments of the noncitizen population constitute priorities for immigration 
enforcement, ultimately developed new mechanisms to facilitate the arrest and 
detention of undocumented immigrants.28  It finds that the Secure Communi-
ties Memorandum (Secure Communities Memo), which announced the creation 
  
24. President Barack Obama, supra note 2; see also President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President 
on Immigration (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/21/ 
remarks-president-immigration [http://perma.cc/BZS8-47PB] [hereinafter Nov. 21, 2014 Obama 
Remarks] (“We’ll keep focusing enforcement resources on actual threats to our security. But that 
means felons, not families.”). 
25. Lisa Marie Cacho, The Rights of Respectability: Ambivalent Allies, Reluctant Rivals, and Disavowed 
Deviants, in IMMIGRANT RIGHTS IN THE SHADOWS OF CITIZENSHIP 190, 199 (Rachel Ida Buff 
ed., 2008). 
26. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of 
Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 703–04 (2002) (explaining the collateral consequences rule 
and observing that courts have not explained how the rule “fits into the system for evaluating claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel”). 
27. While eleven memoranda were released as part of the Executive Actions, this Article focuses on the 
three that arguably have the biggest impact on unauthorized migrant populations currently living in 
the United States: “Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented 
Immigrants” (Priorities Memo, supra note 6), the Secure Communities Memo (infra note 29), and 
“Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as 
Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or 
Permanent Residents” (Deferred Action Memo, infra note 30). 
28. See Priorities Memo, supra note 6. 
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of the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) simply rebranded, rather than re-
placed, Secure Communities (S-Comm)—a predecessor program that established 
full information sharing between local law enforcement and federal immigration 
officials.29  Finally, through an analysis of the Deferred Action Memorandum 
(Deferred Action Memo)—the memorandum that lays out the parameters of the 
new extended forms of deferred action for childhood arrivals and parents of U.S. 
citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents—Part I examines the ideological justifi-
cations for protecting certain sectors of the undocumented population from deten-
tion and deportation, while hypercriminalizing the rest.30  In Part II, the Article 
lays out how the three memos contribute to the phenomenon known as net wid-
ening—creating wider, stronger, and different nets of social control over broad 
swaths of the noncitizen population.31  It also examines how the rhetoric that at-
tempts to differentiate immigrants from so-called real criminals contributes to net 
widening and inadvertently shores up the ever-expanding category of criminal al-
ien as one suitable for the distribution of the harms of detention and deportation.  
Part III argues that in order to avoid future cycles of refinement and expansion of 
criminal enforcement efforts, advocates and scholars must fully grapple with no-
tions of migrant criminality and criminality in general, in an effort to dismantle 
the distribution of harms based on being a “criminal alien.”  Ultimately, by ex-
amining the Executive Actions through the lens of the “criminal alien,” this Arti-
cle seeks to both shape how scholars conceptualize the continual expansion of this 
category and encourage immigrant advocates to invest in strategies that can halt 
this expansion and begin its downfall. 
  
29. See Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. on Secure 
Communities to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Megan 
Mack, Officer, Off. of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties & Phillip A. McNamara, Assistant Sec’y, 
Intergovernmental Affairs (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_ 
1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf [http://perma.cc/U4TU-U2WA] [hereinafter “Secure 
Communities Memo”]. 
30. See Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. on Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children 
and With Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent 
Residents, to León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. 
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t & R. Gil Kelikowske, Comm’r, U.S. 
Customs & Border Prot. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_ 
1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/8B9C-6QZN] [hereinafter the “Deferred 
Action Memo”]. 
31. See James Austin & Barry Krisberg, Wider, Stronger, and Different Nets: The Dialectics of Criminal 
Justice Reform, 18 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 165, 169 (1981) (“The criminal justice system can be 
conceptualized as a net or series of nets functioning to regulate and control personal behavior.  Each 
component of the justice system . . . is authorized by the state to intervene in our personal lives.”). 
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I. THE EXECUTIVE ACTIONS MEMORANDA 
A. The Priorities Memo 
1. The Creation of the Significant Misdemeanor 
In June 2012, the Secretary of DHS announced the creation of Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a program that offered a reprieve from 
deportation for eligible unauthorized migrants who had arrived in the United 
States as children.32  Applications for DACA are processed by U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Service (USCIS), the federal agency charged with administering 
immigration benefits.33  Those who qualify receive a renewable employment au-
thorization document and reprieve from deportation for two years.34  DACA rep-
resents a victory for immigrant youth who had been organizing for reform;35 
recipients of DACA are able to receive social security numbers, and in some 
states driver’s licenses or other forms of formal identification.36  Although DACA 
  
32. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., on Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion With Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children, 
to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorakas, Dir., 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t 
(June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-indivi 
duals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/F7JG-SP5R] [hereinafter June 15, 2012 
Discretion Memo]. 
33. See About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus [http://perma. 
cc/92X8-KU68] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
34. See General Information: How Do I Request Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals?, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 2 (Oct. 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ 
USCIS/Resources/daca.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y3Z8-7UXP]. 
35. See Miriam Jordan, Anatomy of a Deferred-Action Dream: How Undocumented Youth Brought Their 
Cause to the Country, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100008723963 
90443982904578046951916986168 [http://perma.cc/EL4R-JN7R] (Describing marches and 
protests in Miami, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles, including the 1,500 mile “Trail of 
Dreams” where four youths marched from Miami to Washington, D.C. to promote the DREAM 
Act); see also Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of 
Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 271–72 (2013) (describing the organization of 
DREAMers into the United We Dream organization preceding the 2010 election season, rallying 
in public events, and publicizing their opposition to the Obama Administration absent more 
promises from the Administration). 
36. Kari E. D’Ottavio, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Why Granting Driver’s Licenses to DACA 
Beneficiaries Makes Constitutional and Political Sense, 72 MD. L. REV. 931, 934 (2013) (“The majority 
of states . . . confirmed that DACA beneficiaries were eligible for driver’s licenses.”); see also Access to 
Driver’s Licenses for Immigrant Youth Granted DACA, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. 1 (May 31, 2015), 
http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=1120 [http://perma.cc/M7YQ-X444] (last updated May 
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is restricted to a particular population, for those who do qualify, the downsides 
appear to be few.37  DACA seems to be a limited, but nonetheless significant 
achievement. 
Not all undocumented immigrant youth qualify for DACA, however.  The 
application form inquires about criminal history, and the instructions, as well as 
USCIS’s guidance on DACA, clarify that a broad range of criminal convictions 
will disqualify applicants.38  This in itself is not unusual; every application for im-
migration relief inquires about criminal history.  In creating the application pro-
cess for DACA, however, DHS created a new crime-based category disqualifying 
applicants for the immigration benefit—the significant misdemeanor.39  The cat-
egory had no statutory basis and was a wholesale invention of the Executive 
Branch. 
The instructions for DACA define the significant misdemeanor as an 
offense of domestic violence; sexual abuse or exploitation; burglary; unlawful 
possession or use of a firearm; drug distribution or trafficking; or driving un-
der the influence; or one for which the individual was sentenced to time in 
custody of 90 days or more (not including a suspended sentence).  The in-
structions for DACA further add that anyone convicted of three or more 
misdemeanors not arising out of the same incident is also disqualified from 
applying for the program.40 
In the rush to celebrate the win, and to mobilize resources to assist potential 
DACA recipients in submitting their applications, little attention was paid by 
immigration advocates to the emergence of this new category.  Attorneys who 
specialize in the intersection of criminal and immigration law did create adviso-
ries and trainings for public defenders who now had to understand the significant 
  
31, 2015) (“[O]therwise-eligible DACA recipients who obtain an employment authorization 
document and a Social Security number are now able to obtain a license in every state”). 
37. See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 2–3. 
38. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca 
#national-security [http://perma.cc/WKA3-EWP8] (last updated Aug. 3, 2015) (conviction of a 
felony offense, significant misdemeanor offense, or three or more other misdemeanor offenses not 
occurring on the same date and not arising out of the same act, omission, or scheme of misconduct 
precludes DACA consideration); see also Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 4 (categorizing the 
second-highest priority individuals for deportation for ICE: “aliens convicted of a ‘significant 
misdemeanor,’ which for these purposes is an offense of domestic violence; sexual abuse or 
exploitation; burglary; unlawful possession or use of a firearm; drug distribution or trafficking; or 
driving under the influence; or if not an offense listed above, one for which the individual was 
sentenced to time in custody of 90 days or more (the sentence must involve time to be served in 
custody, and does not include a suspended sentence) . . . .”). 
39. Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 4. 
40. Id. at 3–4. 
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misdemeanor in order to properly advise their noncitizen clients on the immigra-
tion consequences of their criminal matters.41  For the most part, however, the 
category remained mostly ignored and undertheorized.  For two and a half years, 
the significant misdemeanor existed only as a disqualifying corollary to an appli-
cation for a nonstatus (deferred action) that was meant to be a temporary fix while 
Congress passed lasting immigration reform. 
2. The Reemergence of the Significant Misdemeanor 
On November 20, 2014, the significant misdemeanor made its first 
appearance outside the DACA application context when President Obama an-
nounced a new round of executive actions on immigration that expanded on the 
2012 announcement of DACA.42  These “Immigration Accountability Execu-
tive Actions” were accompanied by DHS’s simultaneous release of a series of 
memoranda laying out proposed reforms to the immigration enforcement sys-
tem.43  The memos were directives from DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson to the vari-
ous directors of DHS’s subagencies charged with managing immigration benefits 
and enforcement.44  This Part focuses on the Executive Action memorandum re-
ferred to as the Priorities Memo and the reintroduction of the significant misde-
meanor category in this context.45 
The Priorities Memo establishes three categories of unauthorized migrants 
who will henceforth be considered priorities for the immigration enforcement ef-
forts carried out by both Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—the DHS agencies charged with inter-
nal immigration enforcement and enforcement of the immigration laws at bor-
ders and ports of entry, respectively.  The logic undergirding the Priorities Memo 
is that the arrest and deportation of the approximately 11 million unauthorized 
migrants living in the United States remains unfeasible; the memo states, “[d]ue 
  
41. See, e.g., Understanding the Criminal Bars to the Deferred Action Policy for Childhood Arrivals, 
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (Oct. 2012), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ilrc-un 
derstanding_criminal_bars_to_deferred_action_5.pdf [http://perma.cc/F4YG-6AS3]; see also 
Practice Advisory: Identifying and Keeping Client’s Eligible for the New “Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA)” Program, WASH. DEF. ASS’N 4 (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.defensenet.org/ 
immigration-project/immigration-resources/WDAIP%20Dreamer%20Deferred%20Action%20 
Advisory%209-13-2012_final.pdf; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372–75 (2010) 
(holding that criminal defense attorneys render ineffective assistance of counsel when they fail to 
warn their noncitizen clients of the immigration consequences of certain pleas). 
42. See President Barack Obama, supra note 2. 
43. See U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., supra note 5. 
44. Id. 
45. Priorities Memo, supra note 6. 
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to limited resources, DHS and its Components cannot respond to all immigra-
tion violations or remove all persons illegally in the United States.”46  Thus, the 
Memo outlines priority categories to assist ICE and CBP agents in deciding 
whether to place an individual in removal (deportation) proceedings, as well as 
aid agents in deciding “whom to stop, question, and arrest; whom to detain or 
release; whether to settle, dismiss, appeal or join in a motion or cause; and whether 
to grant deferred action, parole or a stay of removal instead of pursuing removal in 
a case.”47 
The Memo defines the top priority for these efforts, Priority 1, as “threats to 
national security, border security, and public safety,” with terrorism suspects, in-
dividuals caught crossing the border unlawfully, gang members, and convicted 
felons constituting groups who “must be prioritized” for removal.48  The Memo 
labels “misdemeanants and new immigration violators” as Priority 2, the group 
that represents the “second-highest priority for apprehension and removal.”49  
Subsection (a) of Priority 2 lists individuals with three or more misdemeanor 
convictions, and subsection (b) lists “aliens convicted of a ‘significant misde-
meanor’” as individuals who “should be removed.”50  Priority 3 names those 
who have been issued an order of removal after January 1, 2014, as the final, and 
lowest-priority, enforcement priority category.51 
The Priority Memo’s addition of the significant misdemeanor to an en-
forcement-related document is a notable development.  The significant misde-
meanor category did not exist before the June 2012 creation of DACA—a program 
that was ostensibly created to protect the most respectable and sympathetic among 
unauthorized migrants in the United States, those who came to this country as 
children.52  DACA was created with the stated purpose of offering deportation 
relief to this population.  With the significant misdemeanor making the leap 
from a program that offered deportation relief in 2012 to the Priorities Memo in 
2014, the act of curbing deportation becomes directly linked to the expansion of 
the categorical criminalization of immigrants. 
This link is heightened by the appearance of the significant misdemeanor in 
two other 2014 Executive Actions memoranda.  The Secure Communities 
Memo, discussed in detail in Part I.B, infra, names significant misdemeanants as 
among the category of noncitizens whose transfer immigration officials should 
  
46. Id. at 2. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 3. 
49. Id.  
50. Id. at 3–4. 
51. Id. at 4. 
52. See June 15, 2012 Discretion Memo, supra note 32. 
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seek from local law enforcement directly to federal immigration agency cus-
tody (and probable detention and removal).53  Additionally, in the Deferred Ac-
tion Memo, discussed in detail in Part I.C, the significant misdemeanor appears as 
a disqualifying factor for the expanded form of DACA, and for Deferred Action 
for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA).54 
The 2014 Executive Actions came about after advocates pushed the Presi-
dent to use his authority to curb the record levels of deportations.55  The creation 
of DAPA and expanded DACA did expand the charmed circle of those who 
would not be subject to deportation.  With the inclusion of the significant mis-
demeanor in the Priorities Memo, however, the very category used to disqualify 
some from protection for deportation would also render them targets for en-
forcement efforts.  With the consolidation of the significant misdemeanor category 
as a priority category for enforcement efforts, deportations, rather than being 
curbed as advocates sought, will likely just be redirected toward newly named cate-
gories of criminal aliens. 
3. The Significant Misdemeanor in Context 
The creation of the significant misdemeanor category, and the accompa-
nying prioritization of unauthorized migrants with misdemeanor convictions 
for deportation, constitute only the latest example of the criminal justice system 
merger with immigration enforcement efforts.56  The significant misdemeanor 
joins the pantheon of categories, including the aggravated felony and the crime 
involving moral turpitude, that for over a century have served as grounds for 
triggering immigration enforcement action, as well as for disqualifying immi-
grants for lawful admission into the United States and for deporting long-term 
residents of the United States.57  This forms part of the context for the rhetoric 
on display in the President’s speech announcing the Executive Actions: 
  
53. See Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29.  
54. See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30. 
55. See, e.g., The Editorial Board, Yes He Can, on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2014/04/06/opinion/sunday/yes-he-can-on-immigration.html [http://perma.cc/B458 
-AVCK] (decrying unprecedented levels of deportation under the Obama Administration, 
endorsing the Not One More campaign, and calling for the removal of quota-based deportation 
programs, an end to Secure Communities, and an extension of sympathetic programs like the 
DREAM Act to other vulnerable undocumented groups). 
56. See Chacón, supra note 13. 
57. See Miller, supra note 13 (describing the criminalization of immigration law through law 
enforcement-focused reforms); see also Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, 
and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 407–09 (2006) (describing the historical movement 
from crimes of “moral turpitude” to a wider variety of crimes that trigger deportation proceedings). 
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Undocumented workers broke our immigration laws, and I believe 
that they must be held accountable—especially those who may be 
dangerous.  That’s why, over the past six years, deportations of crimi-
nals are up 80 percent.  And that’s why we’re going to keep focusing 
enforcement resources on actual threats to our security.  Felons, not 
families.  Criminals, not children.  Gang members, not a mother who's 
working hard to provide for her kids.  We’ll prioritize, just like law en-
forcement does every day . . . . If you meet the criteria, you can come 
out of the shadows and get right with the law.  If you're a criminal, 
you'll be deported.58 
While anti-immigrant actors accused the President of going too far in 
providing what they termed an “executive amnesty,” immigrant advocates cri-
tiqued the “felons, not families” line as overly simplistic, divisive, and dehu-
manizing.59  When viewed in the context of decades of deployment of categories 
like the aggravated felony and crime involving moral turpitude, however, the 
rhetoric is unsurprising.  The “felons not families” catchphrase reveals the federal 
government’s view that a criminal conviction shifts an immigrant’s identity from 
a possible parent or worker or child to a body to be processed for detention and 
deportation.  Immigrants have come to be defined by their contact with the crim-
inal justice system; a noncitizen with a criminal record automatically becomes a 
felon indistinguishable from her criminal record. 
By including the significant misdemeanor category under Priority 2, the 
Priorities Memo clarifies that for the purposes of “focusing enforcement re-
sources on actual threats to our security,” the Executive Branch considers indi-
viduals with misdemeanor convictions to be “felons, not families.”60  They are 
completely divorced from their familial or community contexts and are not al-
lowed to simultaneously be considered partners, siblings, or parents.  Obama’s 
repeated invocation of the “felons, not families” line mirrors the reality that an 
increasingly broad range of criminal convictions is enough to transform a 
noncitizen into a felon—permanently marked as unworthy of membership in 
society, and thus a proper target for immigration enforcement efforts.61  The fel-
on category, at least as wielded by Obama in his speeches, has gone far past the 
borders of the actual felony conviction in criminal court.  As clarified by the Pri-
orities Memo, the individuals newly designated by the Executive Branch as 
  
58. President Barack Obama, supra note 2; see also Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24. 
59. See, e.g., Lauren-Brooke Eisen, ‘Felons, Not Families’ Oversimplifies a Complex Reality, HUFF. POST: 
THE BLOG (Nov. 24, 2014, 12:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laurenbrooke-eisen/ 
felons-not-families-overs_b_6212550.html [http://perma.cc/44QH-F4D2]. 
60. See Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24; see also Priorities Memo, supra note 6. 
61. Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
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“criminal aliens,” include those convicted of the reified significant misdemeanor, 
as well as those convicted of three or more misdemeanors.62 
4. Cumulative Harms: Layering Immigration Enforcement on Criminal 
Justice Dysfunction 
The Priorities Memo’s refocusing of immigration enforcement toward in-
dividuals with an increasingly broad array of misdemeanor convictions demands 
an analysis of the mechanisms by which immigrants become misdemeanants.  By 
explicitly naming misdemeanants as priorities for detention and removal, DHS 
piles the shortcomings of the misdemeanor adjudication system on top of the 
harms of the immigration system, creating cumulative harms. 
A broad and growing literature describes the effects stemming from crimi-
nal convictions as collateral consequences.63  While much of this literature has 
touched on the consequences of felony convictions, the consequences extend to 
all convictions, including misdemeanor ones.64  The collateral consequences of 
misdemeanors, even for individuals who do not spend a day in jail, include fines 
and supervisions that derail economic and personal well-being, inhibiting an in-
dividual’s access to public benefits and higher education (including educational 
loans), and preventing him or her from getting a job, loan, or lease.65  Immigra-
tion consequences are chief among the frequently listed collateral consequences 
of criminal convictions.  Indeed, an entire “crimmigration” literature and legal 
practice have grown around this topic, encouraged by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Padilla v. Kentucky, which recognizes that competent criminal defense 
must include consideration of the immigration consequences of criminal pleas.66 
  
62. Id. 
63. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequence of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and 
Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010) (comparing collateral consequences of criminal convictions 
in the United States with other countries); see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND 
FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2007) 
(examining the effect of easily accessible arrest records on employment opportunities for convicted 
individuals); Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 
B.C.L. REV. 255, 282–83 (2004) (discussing felon disenfranchisement). 
64. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1089–94 (2015) 
(arguing for decriminalization of minor offenses to reduce the collateral consequence of nonfelony 
convictions). 
65. Id. at 1103. 
66. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374–75 (2010); see also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, 
Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s Two-Tiered Duty for Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 844 (2013) (analyzing a 
trend toward extension of the right to counsel in immigration proceeding and concluding that 
Padilla adopts a “Strickland-lite” approach that weakens the standard for effective assistance of 
counsel as compared to criminal proceedings).  
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Given the full integration of the criminal and immigration systems—an 
integration that flows in both directions—the term collateral consequences may 
no longer serve to describe the relationship between the two systems.  The immi-
gration system has now been injected into the criminal system in the form of re-
quests by ICE to the criminal system to notify ICE officers of the arrests of 
noncitizens (known as ICE detainers or ICE holds); the full integration of im-
migration databases into the fingerprinting procedures of the criminal system; 
and the deputizing (both formal and informal) of local law enforcement to carry 
out immigration functions.67  Likewise, the criminal system has been injected 
into the immigration system, with the traditionally civil immigration system 
taking on the punitive aspects of criminal law,68 and with the vast expansion of 
the categories of crimes that can result in expulsion or exclusion.69  With this 
backdrop, the term collateral consequences centers only the criminal experience 
and sees all consequences of the criminal contact as secondary.  Particularly in 
the misdemeanor realm, however, the criminal consequences may pale compared 
to the almost guaranteed months (and possibly years) of immigration detention 
and the almost certain exile that many misdemeanor convictions now engender.  
For these reasons, cumulative consequences may be a more apt descriptor than 
collateral consequences. 
In the context of the creation of the significant misdemeanor, peeling apart 
these layers of cumulative harms requires an examination of the dysfunctions of 
the misdemeanor adjudication system.  In a series of articles, criminal scholar 
Alexandra Natapoff presents a devastating critique of the use of the misdemeanor 
as a tool of criminal punishment.70  Contending that the “U.S. criminal process 
  
67. See Chacón, supra note 13, at 643–46. 
68. See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s 
Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305 (2000) (comparing distinctions 
between punitive civil remedies and deportation proceedings to argue that the procedural safeguards 
present in criminal proceedings should extend to deportation proceedings); see also Legomsky, supra 
note 12 (arguing that “immigration law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and 
priorities of the criminal enforcement model” while explicitly rejecting the procedural ingredients of 
criminal adjudication). 
69. The drastic rise in the percentage of federal criminal cases related to the immigration crimes of illegal 
entry and illegal reentry, alongside the proliferation of state and local ordinances criminalizing 
migration-related offenses, also forms part of this picture.  See Chacón, supra note 13, at 614–16. 
70. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313–14 (2012) [hereinafter 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors] (arguing that informal, deregulated processing, weak prosecutorial 
screening, poor defense bar, and high plea rates contribute to mass conviction of petty misdemeanor 
offenses, which carry harsh consequences and implicate due process concerns); see also Alexandra 
Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043 (2013) (critiquing 
the practice of aggregate treatment of misdemeanor offenses, which are increasingly addressed by 
category instead of individual treatment according to standard local practices and pricing); Natapoff, 
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cannot be fully understood or evaluated without acknowledging the centrality of 
petty offenses[,]”71 she finds that the lack of procedural integrity and the raciali-
zation of crime constitute core attributes of misdemeanor convictions.72  Nata-
poff presents convincing evidence that the lack of procedural integrity in 
misdemeanor processing frequently leads to wrongful convictions rooted in the 
absence of evidence of individual fault.73  On the racialization of crime, she 
demonstrates that the lack of procedure during the plea or trial phase of the mis-
demeanor process transfers the legal authority, as to who will be convicted, to 
police officers at the moment of arrest.  This transfer means that a misdemeanor 
arrest is overwhelmingly likely to result in a misdemeanor conviction.  Because 
racial profiling is a reality in urban policing, the increased legal authority given to 
police officers translates into the mass criminalization of people of color, par-
ticularly those most likely to draw police attention, including young men, and 
queer and gender-nonconforming people.74  Drawing in part on Natapoff's 
work, immigration scholar Jason Cade has also tackled what he calls the “plea 
bargain crisis” for noncitizens in misdemeanor courts, arguing that for reasons 
having to do with dysfunction in both the criminal and immigration systems, a 
noncitizen’s low-level conviction does not reliably indicate guilt and is likely to 
be the product of unchecked constitutional rights violations.75 
Young Latino men, the group that disproportionately bears the brunt of 
the immigration detention and removal apparatus,76 are among the young men 
of color most likely to be subject to misdemeanor arrests without probable cause, 
particularly when they reside in poor communities where high-volume policing 
is the norm.77  Natapoff lays out the many reasons police may arrest for reasons 
other than probable cause, including control of the streets and assertion of police 
authority.78  These arrests are rarely scrutinized, and lack of prosecutorial screening, 
lack of counsel, and the pressure to plead result in a misdemeanor arrest translating 
almost automatically into a conviction.  With ten million misdemeanor cases filed 
  
supra note 64 (analyzing the recent trend toward decriminalizing misdemeanor offenses to meet the 
current mass incarceration policy developments). 
71. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 70, at 1317. 
72. Id. at 1317. 
73. Id.  
74. Id. at 1319. 
75. See Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1751 (2013). 
76. See ICE Deportations: Gender, Age, and Country of Citizenship, TRAC IMMIGR. (Apr. 9, 2014), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/350 [http://perma.cc/X5QV-V7H3] (noting that between 
2012 and 2013, more than 90 percent of ICE deportees were male). 
77. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 70, at 1330–31. 
78. Id. at 1331–32. 
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annually in the United States (as compared to the one million felony convictions 
entered),79 the misdemeanor process represents “the concrete mechanism by 
which the system is able to generate ‘criminals’ based on race, class, and social vul-
nerability, unconstrained by evidentiary requirements.”80 
The problems with which Natapoff and others have diagnosed the criminal 
justice system, particularly with regard to misdemeanor offenses, become layered 
on top of the harms of the immigration system.  This cumulative effect can be 
witnessed most clearly when considering the role that race plays in immigration 
enforcement, at both the local criminal enforcement and federal immigration en-
forcement levels.  Jennifer Chacón, Yolanda Velasquez, and others have tracked 
the way local law enforcement officers may “more vigorously police populations 
that they identify as potentially ‘illegal,’” leading to the racial profiling of poor 
Latinos and others who live in immigrant communities.81  These individuals may 
be more likely “to be stopped, arrested, and detained for low-level state and local 
criminal offenses as they are caught up in an informal dragnet aimed at immigra-
tion violators.”82  The racially disparate effects of this informal dragnet have been 
verified by researchers at the Warren Institute, who found that when local police 
in Irving, Texas, were given 24-hour access to ICE officers, Latinos were arrested 
for the lowest-level misdemeanor offenses at rates significantly higher than whites 
and African Americans.83  The brushes with law enforcement for low-level mis-
demeanors led to many of those arrested being transferred to ICE custody, pre-
sumably for detention and deportation.84  The study’s authors concluded that the 
ICE-police partnership “tacitly encourages local police to arrest Hispanics for 
petty offenses.”85 
The racialization of crime endemic to the misdemeanor process is layered 
on top of the informal dragnet deployed against those who are perceived to be not 
only people of color but also potentially noncitizens.  These dual phenomena pre-
sent arguably the worst manifestation of the cumulative harms of the criminal and 
migratory control systems.  The Executive Branch’s buttressing of the significant 
misdemeanor priority (and the three or more misdemeanor priority category) 
  
79. Id. at 1314–15. 
80. Id. at 1368. 
81. Chacón, supra note 13, at 646. 
82. Id. 
83. Trevor Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE Criminal Alien 
Program, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY 1, 2 (Sept. 
2009), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4JB-
JPEY]. 
84. See id. at 3. 
85. Id.  
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should be considered in light of these cumulative harms.  By explicitly naming 
misdemeanants as priorities for detention and removal, DHS layers the 
shortcomings of the misdemeanor adjudication system on top of the harms of 
the immigration system.  DHS generates “criminal aliens” along lines of race, 
class, and social vulnerability in conjunction with the criminal justice system.86  
The inclusion of the significant misdemeanor and the three or more misde-
meanors categories in the Priorities Memo—categories that focus on a broad 
range of minor criminal conduct for which the most disadvantaged populations 
are targeted—reaffirms the validity of using crime as a tool of immigration en-
forcement, even as it ignores the dysfunctions in the criminal system.87 
5. Immigration Enforcement Has Become Self-Generating 
The inclusion of misdemeanors in the Priorities Memo also contributes to 
the self-generating nature of the immigration enforcement system, a process par-
allel to what is occurring in the criminal system.  In her article, “Incarceration 
American-Style,” criminal scholar Sharon Dolovich explores the claim that the 
U.S. carceral system, while falling far short of serving society’s interests, has 
become immune from challenges and has become self-perpetuating.88  She argues 
that there is nothing inevitable about incarceration, but that the inability to imag-
ine a response other than incarceration stems not from “the offenders’ choice to 
offend, but society’s choice to respond to those offenses with time in prison.”89  
Incarceration, according to Dolovich, “has become the first-line policy response 
to a range of social problems, the instinctive American response to perceived 
threats to the social order.”90  She further proposes that the criminal system 
“makes its own inmates.”91  She gives examples of the harms and humiliations 
that accompany prison life and life after prison for those marked as ex-cons; these 
harms are a force in generating behavior that leads to further imprisonment.92 
The immigration enforcement apparatus appears to have also reached the 
point of self-generation, albeit through different mechanisms.  This is due, in no 
small part, to the ever-increasing ties between criminal punishment and immigra-
  
86. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 70, at 1368 (discussing the effect of misdemeanors on the 
generation of criminals along lines of race, class, and social vulnerability). 
87. See Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1066 (arguing that decriminalization of minor offenses, while 
addressing procedural questions regarding punishment, fails to address more global criticisms of the 
criminal justice system). 
88. See Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237 (2009). 
89. Id. at 241. 
90. Id. at 239. 
91. Id. at 243. 
92. Id.  
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tion enforcement.93  The self-generation of immigration enforcement can be seen 
in the way that the President’s Executive Actions marked a new category of peo-
ple—those who have been convicted of significant misdemeanors or three or more 
misdemeanors—as criminal aliens.94  Even as the Executive Branch potentially 
removed some individuals from ICE’s crosshairs by expanding deferred action 
through DAPA and expanded DACA, it redirected enforcement by expanding 
the category of those who were proper subjects of ICE’s attentions.  The “felons, 
not families” catchphrase in the President’s speech announcing the Executive Ac-
tions, combined with the expansion of the categories of those considered criminal 
aliens to include more petty offenders, displays this self-generating logic; the fed-
eral immigration enforcement apparatus can no longer seem to imagine a response 
to unlawful migration that does not further the criminalization of immigrants.  
As in the criminal context, then, the federal immigration system “makes its own 
inmates”95 by constantly expanding the categories of immigrants who can be sub-
ject to its detention and deportation powers. 
Ironically, it is exactly this expansion of immigration enforcement, hand in 
hand with the consolidation of the immigration and criminal systems, that also 
leads the immigration system to “make its own inmates” in the more literal sense 
Dolovich describes.96  The noncitizens, identified as “criminal aliens” through the 
criminal system and are subsequently deported, include many who leave behind 
deep community ties and who seek to reenter the United States following their 
removal.97  The Executive Actions memoranda included this category of depor-
tees as Priority 1 (the highest priority level), in the same document that establishes 
those convicted of significant misdemeanors or three or more misdemeanors as 
the second-highest priority.98  Under this guidance, a noncitizen who is convicted 
of a DUI would be prioritized for transfer to immigration detention and likely 
deported, because a DUI conviction is considered a significant misdemeanor.99  
  
93. See García Hernández, supra note 107, at 1457–58. 
94. See Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 3–4; see also Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 4. 
95. See Dolovich, supra note 88, at 243. 
96. See id.  
97. See Erin R. Hamilton, Deportees Will Risk Harsh Penalties to Return to Families in the U.S., 3 CTR. 
FOR POVERTY RES. 1, 1 (2013), http://poverty.ucdavis.edu/sites/main/files/file-attachments/cpr 
_hamilton_immigration_brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/E3EA-P4RQ] (“In 2013, the U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement [ICE] agency deported 72,000 parents of children who are U.S. citizens. 
These parents make up one-fourth of all deportees.”). 
98. See Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
99. See id. at 4.  There is not strict uniformity or court interpretation of the term “significant misdemeanor” 
and not every driving under the influence (DUI) conviction will necessarily be considered to be one.  
Whether a DUI is considered a significant misdemeanor will vary by jurisdiction and by the applicable 
state statute.  As of September 2015, ICE had released guidance stating, 
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If they sought to rejoin their families and communities by reentering the United 
States, they would become “Priority 1 threats to national security, border security, 
and public safety” because “aliens apprehended at the border or ports of entry 
while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States” are included in this cate-
gory.100  Thus, a misdemeanant seeking to enter the United States subsequent to 
his removal is second only to “aliens engaged in or suspected of terrorism or espi-
onage”101 in the list of priorities for the immigration enforcement system.  In this 
way, the Priorities Memo serves to “make inmates” by creating self-perpetuating 
targets for immigration detention and removal.102 
As Priority 1 threats, these noncitizens deported following DUI convictions 
will face further hurdles if they attempt to return following their deportations.  
In years past, noncitizens arrested at the border attempting to enter the country 
unlawfully might spend a few nights in immigration detention before being 
removed, or might be deported the same day.103  In recent years, however, a 
new tactic has been used: Those caught trying to unlawfully enter the United 
States now face criminal prosecution—and subsequent incarceration in federal 
prisons—for the federal crimes of illegal entry (the crime of crossing the border 
unlawfully) and illegal reentry (the crime of crossing the border unlawfully after 
a previous removal (deportation)).104  Only after completing criminal sentences 
are these noncitizens then subject to immigration enforcement in the form of 
deportation.  With more than two million individuals deported during the first 
  
 When determining whether a conviction for DUI is a significant misdemean-
or, the elements of the applicable state law must be considered.  A conviction (re-
quiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt) for DUI is a significant misdemeanor if 
the state statute of conviction: (1) constitutes a misdemeanor as defined by federal 
law (the minimum penalty includes imprisonment for more than 5 days but not 
more than 1 year); (2) requires the operation of a motor vehicle; and (3) requires, as 
an element of the offense, either a finding of impairment or a blood alcohol con-
tent of .08 or higher. 
 See Frequently Asked Questions Relating to Executive Action on Immigration, U.S. IMMIGR. & 
CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/ImmigrationAction/faqs [https://perma.cc/DEY6-JRJ9] 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
100. See Priorities Memo, supra note 6, at 3. 
101. See id. 
102. See Dolovich, supra note 88, at 243. 
103. See Lara Jakes Jordan, U.S. Ends ‘Catch-and-Release’ at Border, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/23/AR2006082301082.html 
[http://perma.cc/XT9N-UPTZ] (“Nearly all non-Mexican illegal immigrants caught sneaking 
into the United States are being held until they can be returned to their home countries . . . [t]he 
new policy generally does not apply to Mexicans, who are almost immediately returned to Mexico 
after being stopped by Border Patrol agents.”). 
104. See Michael T. Light, Mark Hugo Lopez & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, The Rise of Federal Immigration 
Crimes: Unlawful Reentry Drives Growth, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispa 
nic.org/2014/03/18/the-rise-of-federal-immigration-crimes [http://perma.cc/F3H C-HMJP]. 
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six years of the Obama Administration, hundreds of thousands may attempt to 
return to the United States to rejoin their communities.105  If the prosecution of 
the immigration crimes of illegal entry and illegal reentry continues at its current 
rate, many of those attempting to return will find themselves in federal prison if 
they are caught at the border.  Again, in this situation, the Executive Branch can 
be said to be “making its own inmates” by deporting millions, then criminally 
prosecuting those who inevitably return.  This process bleeds across the line to 
the carceral system Dolovich critiques, as immigration-related crimes overtake 
drug offenses as the largest chunk of the federal criminal enforcement pie.106 
Even as the federal government cements the strategy of making it accepta-
ble to both punish immigrants who have committed crimes with detention and 
removal and punish those who attempt to reenter after removal,107 it expands the 
categories of people who can be considered punishable.  A strategy of targeting 
“felons, not families”108 only makes sense if there is an ever-widening group of 
“criminal aliens” to target.  In 2007, the ACLU of Massachusetts exposed Op-
eration Endgame—an ICE operation that endeavored to remove all unauthor-
ized migrants by 2012.109  ICE authorities quickly responded to the revelation by 
removing any mention of Operation Endgame from their publicly available doc-
uments.110  Despite ICE’s attempts to hide explicit mention of its mission, the 
underlying logic of Operation Endgame is alive and well in the Executive Ac-
tions’ treatment of individuals with misdemeanor convictions. 
  
105. Hamilton, supra note 97, at 2. 
106. See id.; see also Turning Migrants into Criminals: The Harmful Impact of US Border Prosecutions, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2 (May 2013), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0513 
_ForUpload_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/N8M2-HLZZ] (“In 2002, there were 3,000 prosecutions for 
illegal entry and 8,000 for illegal reentry; a decade later, in 2012, these prosecutions had increased to 
48,000 and 37,000, respectively.  These cases now outnumber other frequently prosecuted federal 
offenses such as drug, firearm, and white collar crimes.”). 
107. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
1346, 1349–50 (2014) (arguing that, under the Supreme Court admonition to consider the 
legislative intent of a statutory provision authorizing detention in order to distinguish regulatory 
from punitive detention, immigration legislation and the legacy Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) detention authority have clearly moved immigration remedies from civil to punitive 
measures). 
108. See Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24. 
109. Carol Rose & Christopher Ott, Inhumane Raid Was Just one of Many, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 26, 2007), 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/03/26/inhumane_raid_
was_just_one_of_many [http://perma.cc/6UJ4-EC7B]. 
110. See “Endgame” Documents: Before and After, ACLU OF MASS. (Apr. 4, 2007, 11:00 PM), http://209. 
68.62.227/endgame [https://perma.cc/C3XS-4HRX]. 
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B. The Secure Communities Memo 
This Part analyzes the strategy through which the criminal alien category 
comes to have meaning as a vector for detention and deportation of unauthorized 
migrants by examining a second Executive Actions memorandum, the Secure 
Communities Memo.111  With this memorandum, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson 
announced the termination of the Secure Communities (S-Comm) program, 
one of the Obama Administration’s chief initiatives to track and deport immi-
grants who have come into contact with the criminal system.  In its place, Secre-
tary Johnson declared the creation of the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP).112  
This Part tracks the initial development of S-Comm and provides a preliminary 
evaluation of the newly announced PEP.  It also analyzes advocacy and organiz-
ing against S-Comm, contending that this advocacy created a crisis of legitimacy 
for S-Comm that the President resolved through the Executive Actions’ creation 
of PEP.  This Part argues that PEP, however, ultimately redirects and refines the 
underlying technologies and policies of S-Comm, rather than ending them. 
1. Background on S-Comm 
The Bush Administration originally unveiled the S-Comm program in 
March 2008.113  The centerpiece of S-Comm was the full integration of immigra-
tion and criminal databases, with the goal of comprehensive information sharing 
between local criminal law enforcement and federal immigration enforcement.114  
Before S-Comm, immigration officers had no automated way to run the names 
and fingerprints of noncitizens held by the criminal system against immigration 
databases.  S-Comm provided this mechanism; with S-Comm, every time local 
law enforcement ran a person’s name through the national Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) database (a practice in which every law enforcement office 
  
111. See Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29. 
112. Id. at 3. 
113. See ICE Unveils Sweeping New Plan to Target Criminal Aliens in Jails Nationwide, U.S. IMMIGR. & 
CUSTOMS ENF’T (Apr. 14, 2008), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-unveils-sweeping-new-
plan-target-criminal-aliens-jails-nationwide-0 [https://perma.cc/NB2R-Y93B]. 
114. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 95 (2013) 
(describing the integration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) biometric database, the 
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), and ICE’s Law Enforcement Support 
Center, which reviews and assesses arrestee status using all available information, including 
fingerprints). 
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engages to look for past warrants and past criminal history of arrestees), that 
information would be transferred by the FBI to ICE.115 
S-Comm brought local involvement in immigration enforcement to unprec-
edented levels, with immigration legal scholars citing the program as “the largest 
expansion of local involvement in immigration enforcement in the nation’s his-
tory.”116  S-Comm reached past simply targeting noncitizens who came into con-
tact with the criminal system, as the low-tech version of S-Comm, the Criminal 
Alien Program, had done for nearly two decades before S-Comm’s incep-
tion.117  Under the Criminal Alien Program, individuals who interfaced with local 
law enforcement already had to be identified as foreign born for ICE to be able to 
interview them.  This labor-intensive process was circumvented by S-Comm, 
which extended the screening by the federal government for immigration viola-
tions to every person—citizen and noncitizen alike—arrested by a local law en-
forcement officer anywhere in the country.118  Even if local law enforcement did 
not want to submit their arrestees’ fingerprints to ICE for checks against their 
databases, they had no choice, as there was no mechanism for them to request 
that the FBI not pass on the fingerprints to ICE.119 
The stated goals of S-Comm were to “identify and remove criminal aliens 
and others who pose a potential threat to public safety” in the name of “smart, 
effective immigration enforcement.”120  The program epitomized the Obama 
Administration’s adoption of the “smart enforcement” ideal.121  The seemingly 
  
115. See Michele Waslin, The Secure Communities Program: Unanswered Questions and Continuing 
Concerns, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. 11 (Nov. 2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/ 
files/docs/Secure_Communities_112911_updated.pdf [http://perma.cc/CSG5-NGM9]. 
116. Cox & Miles, supra note 114, at 93. 
117. For a portrait of the Criminal Alien Program, see Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism 
Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1118 (2013). 
118. See Cox & Miles, supra note 114, at 93. 
119. As S-Comm spread nationwide, Obama announced the rollback of 287(g) agreements, or federal-
local agreements that deputized local law enforcement officers as immigration authorities.  Because 
of the broad and mandatory reach of S-Comm, the administration may have had less of a need for 
287(g), which required trainings and memoranda of understanding to be signed and implemented 
with local law enforcement agencies.  S-Comm thus became the primary vector for identifying 
noncitizens who experienced arrests by local law enforcement officials.  See Ted Hesson, As One 
Immigration Enforcement Program Fades Away, Another Rises, ABC NEWS (Dec. 27, 2012), http:// 
abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/immigration-enforcement-program-287g-scaled-
back/story?id=18077757 [http://perma.cc/N5CF-LHYF]. 
120. Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, http://www.ice.gov/secure-co 
mmunities/get-the-facts [https://web.archive.org/web/20150409114817/http://www.ice.gov/secure 
-communities/get-the-facts] (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
121. See Fact Sheet: Smart, Effective Border Security and Immigration Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T. OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/10/04/fact-sheet-smart-effec 
tive-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement [http://perma.cc/Y887-DXBF] (“DHS is 
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indiscriminate removals under the Obama Administration, which had surpassed 
the two million mark at the time of this writing, were a direct result of this strat-
egy.  “Smart enforcement,” characterized by the supposed sorting of migrants by 
risk level that S-Comm facilitated (and which PEP solidifies), in reality resulted 
in the possible removal of any noncitizen who came into contact with law en-
forcement; regardless of where they fell in the risk-level categorization provided 
by S-Comm, they were counted as “criminal aliens.”122 
From S-Comm’s inception, the government appeared to pursue a different 
agenda than “smart, effective immigration enforcement.”123  DHS activated the 
program county by county over the course of several years, based on what they 
referred to as a “risk-based rollout strategy” meant to target those counties with the 
highest possible percentage of noncitizens.124  Adam Cox and Thomas Miles car-
ried out an empirical study tracking the activation, finding that “Hispanics consti-
tuted 37.9 percent of the population in early-activating counties and only 6.8 
percent in counties activating later.”125  They also found that that while early ac-
tivation targeted counties “with large Hispanic populations,” it “did not target 
counties with large noncitizen populations.”126  They concluded, “the correlation 
between activation and Hispanic population is extremely persistent: it remains 
large and statistically significant even when we control for border proximity and 
myriad other factors on which the government might have relied in deciding 
where to target its limited enforcement resources.”127  In analyzing their data, 
Cox and Miles cite to Bernard Harcourt’s critique of the rise in the role of pre-
diction and systematization, acknowledging that the seemingly neutral mode of 
policing that S-Comm represents “can in practice concentrate the burdens of 
law enforcement on minority communities.”128  Cox and Miles’ study demon-
strates that the “smart enforcement” strategy was an explicitly racialized one, 
  
focused on smart and effective enforcement of U.S. immigration laws in a manner that best 
promotes public safety, border security, and the integrity of the immigration system.”). 
122. See Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, TRAC IMMIGR. (Apr. 8, 2014), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/349 [http://perma.cc/UVP2-BW4T] (“Analysis of ICE 
data covering these 2.3 million deportations obtained by [Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC)] show that while the agency was able to increase the number of noncitizens 
it deported who had been convicted of a crime, this was largely a result of an increase in the 
deportations of individuals whose most serious conviction was an immigration or traffic violation.”). 
123. Secure Communities: Get the Facts, supra note 120. 
124. Cox & Miles, supra note 114, at 105. 
125. Id. at 114. 
126. Id. at 121. 
127. Id. at 134. 
128. Id. at 133. 
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disproportionately distributing the burden of detention and deportation of im-
migrants on Latino communities. 
By the beginning of 2013, S-Comm was activated in all counties.129  
Despite the pushback from local jurisdictions that resisted activation, S-Comm 
achieved its greatest success by bringing information sharing between local 
criminal and federal immigration officials to new heights.  Data sharing was 
only part of the work of S-Comm, however.  The integration of the databases al-
lowed ICE officials to be notified when the immigration databases registered a 
match—that is, when the person arrested had a record of being fingerprinted by 
a federal immigration official.  At this point, ICE officials had the option to is-
sue a detainer on the person, or a request that the state or local jail facility hold 
the person for an extra 48 hours, ostensibly to allow ICE to interview her.130  In 
practice, the ICE detainers meant the nearly automatic transfer of individuals 
from police custody to ICE custody, with detention and removal proceedings 
ensuing. 
While ICE initially claimed to be most interested in pursuing immigrants 
who had already been convicted of crimes, the agency abandoned this in prac-
tice, issuing detainer requests indiscriminately for anyone who had been arrest-
ed, fingerprinted, and was identified as being a match with the databases.131  
The program statistics showed that in 2011, over half of those removed due to 
S-Comm either had no criminal conviction at all, or a conviction for a minor 
crime resulting in a sentence less than a year.132  This belied the agency’s own 
S-Comm propaganda, which claimed that “ICE prioritizes the removal of crim-
inal aliens by focusing efforts on the most dangerous and violent offenders.”133  
  
129. See Activated Jurisdictions, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T 1 (2013), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYA9-4DSQ] (“As of January 22, 
2013, the biometric information sharing capability is activated in 3,181 jurisdictions in 50 states, U.S. 
Territories and Washington D.C.”). 
130. See Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Secure Communities (SC) Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 8 (2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sec 
ure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MNU-7LGT]. 
131. See Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, supra note 122. 
132. Secure Communities: IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability: Monthly Statistics Through September 30, 2011, 
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/ 
nationwide_interoperability_stats-fy2011-to-date.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VTP-B5BB] (Eighty-
two percent of undocumented IDENT matches resulted in identification of an individual charged 
with a Level 2 or Level 3 offense, which constitute minor crimes resulting in a sentence less than a 
year.  Four percent of undocumented IDENT matches resulted in identification of individuals with 
no charges). 
133. Secure Communities: A Modernized Approach to Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Jan. 2010), http://www.cityofws.org/portals/0/pdf/police/sc_bro 
chure_508.pdf [http://perma.cc/PMU6-2XNC]. 
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An analysis of removal data spanning from 2008 to 2013 came to the same con-
clusion: the number of individuals considered Level 1 offenders, S-Comm’s des-
ignated target, actually declined during the time period studied.134  Among those 
who were deported with a criminal offense on their record, the top four catego-
ries were illegal entry (with 46,759 removals in fiscal year 2013), DUI (with 
29,852 removals in the same time period), a traffic offense (15,548 removals), 
and marijuana possession (6770 removals).135  Given that illegal entry and DUI 
hold the top two places in this list, it is unsurprising that with the November 
2014 Executive Actions, DHS announced that those who enter the country 
unlawfully and those with a DUI (a significant misdemeanor) will now be con-
sidered Priority 1 and Priority 2 for removal, respectively.136 
By elevating reentry and traffic offenses to high-priority reasons for removal, 
ICE has successfully matched its rhetoric to the reality of removals of individuals 
with low-level misdemeanors or simple violations.  ICE appears to be using this 
rebranding mechanism to immunize itself from the critiques that plagued the 
S-Comm program and led to its announced termination. 
2. Critiques of S-Comm and Its Refinement Into the PEP Program 
Drawing anything but a conjectural link between activism and advocacy on 
one hand, and changes in government policy on the other, can often prove diffi-
cult.  In the Secure Communities Memo, however, DHS Secretary Johnson ex-
plicitly acknowledges the role that community opposition played in the decision 
to discontinue S-Comm: 
[T]he reality is the program has attracted a great deal of criticism, is 
widely misunderstood, and is embroiled in litigation; its very name 
has become a symbol for general hostility toward the enforcement of 
our immigration laws.  Governors, mayors, and state and local law 
enforcement officials around the country have increasingly refused to 
cooperate with the program, and many have issued executive orders 
or signed laws prohibiting such cooperation.137 
  
134. See Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, supra note 122 (“More striking is 
that there has been an absolute decline in the number of noncitizens removed who have been 
convicted of any crime apart from traffic and immigration.”). 
135. Id. at Table 5. 
136. As discussed supra note 96, whether a particular DUI conviction is ultimately considered a significant 
misdemeanor will vary by jurisdiction and by the applicable state statute. 
137. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 1. 
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The Secretary’s acknowledgement of the pushback against S-Comm was a de-
parture, as a rigorous defense of S-Comm had until that point characterized 
ICE’s responses to the program's critics.138 
The resistance to S-Comm was broad ranging; everyone from law en-
forcement officials to immigration attorneys to undocumented activists partici-
pated in resisting the program, with demands ranging from requests for reform 
and transparency to demands that the program be ended, not mended.139  Despite 
the range of actors and tactics, those pushing against S-Comm were united in 
some common critiques.  Ultimately, these critiques attacked the way the pro-
gram was being carried out in seeming opposition to its stated goal of arresting 
and deporting “criminal aliens.”  Meanwhile, attacks to the underlying logic of 
the removal of so-called criminal aliens were virtually nonexistent.  The absence of 
critiques of the underlying goals of S-Comm is reflected in the limited changes 
announced by the Obama Administration in November 2014.  While the Secure 
Communities Memo announced that S-Comm “as we know it, will be discontin-
ued,” the announced changes constitute a mere rebranding of S-Comm.  The new 
version of S-Comm, which the Memo announces “should be referred to as the 
‘Priority Enforcement Program’ or ‘PEP,’”140 amounts to a refinement rather than 
a dismantling of S-Comm. 
 
Critique 1: S-Comm Cast Too Wide a Net 
 
The resistance against S-Comm fell under two primary categories: (a) cri-
tiques of whom the program was sweeping up, and (b) critiques of the manner in 
which the program’s dragnet was being deployed.  The first critique was premised 
on the claim that S-Comm was not doing what ICE claimed it would do.  Advo-
  
138. See, e.g., ICE Response to the Task Force on Secure Communities Findings and Recommendations, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac/ice-
response-to-task-force-on-secure-communities.pdf [http://perma.cc/L7S2-9B7D] (presenting a 
staunch, defensive position in response to critiques by the Task Force on Secure Communities, 
created in June 2011 at the request of Jeh Johnson, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)). 
139. See, e.g., Pablo Alvarado, Secure Communities: “End It, Don’t Mend It,” HUFF. POST BLOG (May 
24, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pablo-alvarado/secure-communities-end-it_b_1375 
81 4.html [http://perma.cc/C4R2-2JYY] (arguing that reforms to S-Comm do not go far 
enough and advocating for a complete end to the program); Elise Foley, Congressional Hispanic 
Caucus Demands Deportation Changes, HUFF. POST (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2014/04/04/congressional-hispanic-caucus-deportation_n_5092192.html [http://perma.cc/ 
UMA5-K79A] (explaining a 2014 letter from the Hispanic Caucus to Secretary Johnson calling 
for reform to deportation priorities and policies, as well as “ending programs that lead to many 
deportations such as [S-Comm] and the 287(g) policy”). 
140. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 3. 
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cates challenged S-Comm’s overly broad net, presenting evidence that S-Comm 
was leading to the deportation of immigrants who were labeled as relatively inno-
cent, not the hardened “criminal aliens” the program was purportedly designed 
to target.141  University-based think tanks and nonprofit immigrant advocacy 
organizations released multiple reports on the program.142  These reports refuted 
the government’s claim that S-Comm was truly targeting “criminal aliens.”  
They exposed that many of those swept up by S-Comm came into police custo-
dy for traffic offenses (including DUIs) and other low-level criminal conduct.  
Moreover, the reports showed that many were never convicted of the crime for 
which they were arrested, but were nonetheless routed to immigration detention 
and into removal (deportation) proceedings.143  The bottom line to these cri-
tiques was that the government’s own data about the removals that resulted from 
S-Comm did not match its rhetoric about focusing on individuals with serious 
criminal convictions.144 
The Secure Communities Memo appears to respond to this critique by di-
recting ICE, in this new era, to facilitate only the removal of those who are con-
victed of certain offenses.  Citing to the Priorities Memo (discussed in Part I.A, 
supra), the Secure Communities Memo, through PEP, directs ICE to seek the 
“transfer of an alien” if she falls under Priority 1 (except for those who are appre-
hended at the border or ports of entry) or subsections (a) and (b) of Priority 2.145  
  
141. See, e.g., Shelve Secure Communities, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/ 
aug/12/opinion/la-ed-secure-20110812 [http://perma.cc/SGM5-JYSC] (“States signed up for [S-
Comm] because they thought it would make their neighborhoods safer by getting serious criminals 
off the streets.  But the government’s own data indicate that more than half of those deported under 
the program were undocumented immigrants with no criminal record or only minor ones—not 
violent felons.”); see also Let Police Pursue Criminals, Not Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/11/opinion/la-ed-secure-20110311 [http://perma.cc/B2QW-
UYQU] (“[S-Comm] isn’t succeeding at targeting violent criminals.  Instead, it is increasingly 
diverting police from public safety for other purposes.”). 
142. See, e.g., Waslin, supra note 115, at 9–10 (describing the failure of S-Comm to make good on the 
goal to deport “dangerous criminals,” instead deporting first-time minor offenders or those who were 
not charged with any crime); see also Andrea Guttin, The Criminal Alien Program: Immigration 
Enforcement in Travis County, Texas, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. 8–9 (Feb. 2010), http://www.immi 
grationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Criminal_Alien_Program_021710.pdf [https://web.archiv 
e.org/web/20150906114645/http://immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Criminal_Alien_
Program_021710.pdf] (examining the use of jail status check programs under the S-Comm 
program in Travis County, Texas, which prompted deportation of immigrants apprehended for 
minor offenses, and in many cases without any criminal charges or history); see also Secure 
Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, supra note 122 (In 2013, ICE deported 
151,833 undocumented immigrants without any criminal convictions). 
143. See sources cited supra note 142.  
144. See id. 
145.  Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 2. 
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These categories are composed of those convicted of three or more misdemean-
ors and those convicted of significant misdemeanors.146 
The Secure Community Memo’s adoption of the Priorities Memo’s new 
categories reflects the deportations that had already been taking place under 
S-Comm since 2008.  An April 2014 report relying on ICE’s own data found 
that in 2013, 216,810 people with criminal convictions were deported (out of a 
total of 368,644 deportations).147  The top two offenses for those deported with 
convictions were the federal misdemeanor of illegal entry (46,759 deportations), 
followed by the traffic offense of DUI (29,852 deportations).148  Those arrested 
for illegal entry face nearly automatic deportation at the end of their federal 
criminal sentences.149  Their original arrests are often carried out by immigration 
authorities themselves, so S-Comm is not necessary to apprehend this popula-
tion.  For the second largest category, however, the existence of local and federal 
law enforcement partnerships is necessary in order to turn a DUI into a deporta-
tion order. 
By transforming the DUI into a significant misdemeanor through the Pri-
orities Memo, and then naming those with significant misdemeanors as appropri-
ate “criminal alien” targets for the revamped S-Comm in the Priorities Memo, 
DHS is performing a sleight of hand.  If people with DUIs continue to be such a 
large part of the removal pie, then PEP’s data will show that the government is 
doing what they said they would do—deporting priority “criminal aliens.”  Noth-
ing will necessarily have to change in terms of ICE’s actual practice—they are al-
ready deporting those convicted of DUIs in high numbers—but DHS will be able 
to respond to the criticism that they are arresting the wrong people, because PEP 
has now named those convicted of DUIs as the right kind of “criminal alien” target.   
The current immigration system relies on low-level, local ICE employees 
to make calls about who to detain and deport, and it remains unclear how effec-
tively centralized guidance from higher-ups (in the form of memoranda like the 
Executive Actions) will trickle down to local offices.150  Even if the guidance 
does not trickle down, if ICE officers continue to target who they have already 
  
146. Id. 
147. Secure Communities and ICE Deportation: A Failed Program?, supra note 122. 
148. Id.   
149. For a discussion of entry and reentry offenses, see Chacón, supra note 13, at 637–39;  see also García 
Hernández, supra note 107, at 1472–73 (describing the steady increase in entry and reentry 
deportations throughout the Bush Administration and continuing throughout the Obama 
Administration). 
150. See Julia Preston, Agents’ Union Stalls Training on Deportation Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/us/illegal-immigrants-who-commit-crimes-focus-of-
deportation.html [http://perma.cc/ALW9-6F5H]. 
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been targeting, the numbers will support a shift from S-Comm to PEP that 
appears responsive to the S-Comm critics’ concerns, simply because DHS has 
recategorized the largest group of people who were facing detention after 
non-immigration arrests, those arrested for DUIs, as a proper target. 
This recalibration of policy that allows DHS’s rhetoric to reflect its existing 
practice, and thereby avoid actual reform, is a familiar move for the agency.  A 
2014 exposé by journalist Garrett M. Graff revealed that when faced with con-
gressional pressure to account for the high levels of corruption within the ranks of 
Border Patrol agents, DHS simply recalibrated how it measured corruption: 
In Obama’s first year, [Customs and Border Protection] and DHS 
leadership even ordered the agency to change its definition of “corrup-
tion” to downplay the number of total incidents.  Instead, according to 
internal affairs official Wong, the agency began to differentiate between 
“mission-compromising corruption”—bribery, narcotics-smuggling or 
human-smuggling allegations—and “non-mission-compromising cor-
ruption,” a “lesser” category of cases that included things like em-
ployees’ sexually assaulting detainees or workplace theft.  Only the 
“mission-compromising” problems, the agency now decreed, would be 
reported to Congress.  (Even rape and attempted murder . . . wouldn’t 
have to be disclosed.)  The distinction helped them wipe nearly a third 
of the corruption cases out of statistics.151 
The Secure Communities Memo promises to collect and analyze data 
from the new PEP to root out “inappropriate use to support or engage in biased 
policing.”152  In line with past practice, DHS will continue gathering data on re-
movals of “criminal aliens.”153  The ordered recalibration of the definition of 
corruption achieved congressionally acceptable, lower levels of Border Patrol cor-
ruption.  Likewise, the recalibration of the term “criminal alien” to include those 
with DUIs, who already face removal at high numbers, under the new category 
significant misdemeanor, will serve to achieve acceptably high levels of the re-
movals of “criminal aliens.” 
The Secure Communities Memo also announced that ICE officers should 
focus their efforts on seeking custody of those who have already been convicted, 
  
151. Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the Border Patrol Became America’s Most Out-of-Control 
Law Enforcement Agency, POLITICO (Nov./Dec. 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/ 
2014/10/border-patrol-the-green-monster-112220_full.html [http://perma.cc/RT9T-97CD]. 
152. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 3. 
153. Id. at 2. 
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not merely those who have been arrested, as was happening under S-Comm.154 
Again, because of the difficulty of making the ICE reforms at the top trickle 
down to local agents, it is hard to know how this directive will play out in the 
field.  Nevertheless, because the key element of S-Comm (the information trans-
fer of local law enforcement’s fingerprints to the FBI, then to DHS databases) 
happens at the time of arrest, noncitizens will be on ICE’s radar whether or not 
they are convicted.  The Secure Communities Memo leaves the first of S-Comm’s 
two goals—identifying noncitizens in criminal custody for transfer to ICE—
untouched.155  Having overcome local resistance to this full information sharing 
and having activated S-Comm everywhere, the Executive Branch appears loath to 
disturb the perfect merger of local arrest information with federal immigration da-
tabases.  Indeed, the Memo directs ICE to “continue to rely on fingerprint-based 
biometric data submitted during bookings by state and local law enforcement 
agencies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for criminal background 
checks.”156  Because this information is transferred at the time of arrest, the fact 
that the Secure Communities Memo directs ICE to wait until an arrested person 
is convicted before seeking them out will be of little comfort to noncitizens who 
have survived by steering clear of immigration authorities.  It remains to be seen 
whether ICE will actually wait until individuals are convicted before seeking their 
transfer, once they know that a noncitizen is in local criminal custody.  Given the 
enormous variance in local practice by ICE officers, the Memo’s shift to the lan-
guage of “conviction” rather than “arrest” is unlikely to trickle down completely to 
local practice. 
 
Critique 2: Local Law Enforcement Unnecessarily Cooperated With ICE 
 
The second set of critiques of S-Comm focused on the cooperation of local 
law enforcement with ICE.  Advocates criticized local law enforcement for 
handing over noncitizens to ICE custody after they were identified through the 
forced information sharing.  As S-Comm was activated in county after county, 
long-time immigration advocates who had already been tracking the Criminal 
Alien Program, as well as advocates alarmed by the new program, began to target 
  
154. See id. (“[U]nless the alien poses a demonstrable risk to national security, enforcement actions 
through the new program will only be taken against aliens who are convicted of specifically 
enumerated crimes.”). 
155. See id. (instead of S-Comm, “ICE should put in its place a program that will continue to rely on 
fingerprint-based biometric data submitted during bookings by state and local law enforcement 
agencies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for criminal background checks.”). 
156. Id. 
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the immigration detainer.157  By campaigning around the voluntary nature of the 
immigration detainer or “ICE hold,” immigration advocates sought to render S-
Comm ineffectual.158  By convincing local law enforcement that they were under 
no obligation to comply with ICE holds, and encouraging them to stop doing so 
using both legal159 and policy arguments,160 advocates sought to attack the mech-
anism that translated a match in the immigration databases into a detention and a 
removal order. 
Advocacy on ICE detainers was successful in many jurisdictions, with cities, 
counties, and in some cases, entire states limiting their cooperation with ICE in 
holding noncitizens.161  While advocates used some of the same arguments about 
the overbroad application of S-Comm against people who had either not been 
convicted or been convicted of low-level offenses in arguing for detainer reform 
on the local level, they also focused on the argument that cooperation with federal 
immigration law enforcement damaged the relationships between immigrant 
  
157. For a broader description of the Criminal Alien Program and immigration, see supra notes 114–116 
and accompanying text.  See Legal Bulletin, BROWARD CTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE (June 19, 2012), 
http://www.ailasouthflorida.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Broward-Sheriff-Legal-Bulletin-
ICE-Detainers.pdf [http://perma.cc/26R3-4HVK] (declining to honor ICE detainers unless 
supported by probable cause in Broward County, Florida); see also Letter from Timothy P. Ryan, 
Miami-Dade Corr. & Rehab. Dep’t. to Marc Jeffrey Moore, Field Off. Dir., U.S. Dep’t. of 
Homeland Sec., Changes to Federal Detainer Procedures (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.ailasouthflorida. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2014.01.07-Implementation-of-Miami-Dade-Detainer-Policy-
2.pdf [http://perma.cc/BE46-9DFV] (honoring ICE detainer requests only with written agreement 
from the federal government to reimburse for all costs related to compliance, and where the inmate 
has a previous conviction for a forcible felony as defined by Florida law, or the inmate is pending a 
charge of a nonbondable offense); Andy Reid, Palm Beach County Sheriff Agrees to Curtail 
Immigration Jailings, SUN SENTINEL (July 22, 2014), http://www.ailasouthflorida.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/01/2014.01.07-Implementation-of-Miami-Dade-Detainer-Policy-2.pdf [http://per 
ma.cc/3RX3-RLZC] (Sheriff Bradshaw of Palm Beach County stopped automatically complying 
with federal detainer requests in response to demands from a coalition of Palm Beach religious 
congregations.). 
158. See LENA GRABER, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYER’S GUILD, THE ALL-IN-
ONE GUIDE TO DEFEATING ICE HOLD REQUESTS (A.K.A. IMMIGRATION DETAINERS) 10, 
(Ann Benson et al. eds., 2012) (emphasizing the optional nature of ICE hold requests, and the 
discretion of local law enforcement). 
159. For a list of lawsuits that halted ICE detainers, see Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, 
at 2 n.1. 
160. See, e.g., Waslin, supra note 115, at 8–9 (analyzing DHS deportation records under S-Comm to 
conclude that, although the stated goal of the program was to prioritize deportations, in practice the 
program casts too wide a net, often deporting low-level offenders or those with no criminal charges). 
161. California, Connecticut, and Maryland adopted statewide laws, policies, or both, limiting 
cooperation with ICE holds, as did some of the most populous counties in the United States, 
including Cook County (Illinois), Miami-Dade County (Florida), King County (Washington), and 
Orange County (California), as well as the District of Columbia.  For a list of states, cities, and 
counties who limited cooperation with ICE holds, see Challenge Unjust Immigration Detainers, 
NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., http://www.immigrantjustice.org/detainers [http://perma.cc/6 
FPJ-LPP9] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
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communities and local law enforcement.162  Particularly in jurisdictions that 
claimed to espouse community policing tactics, advocates argued that immi-
grants would be less likely to call the police to report crimes when contact with 
local law enforcement served as a conduit to immigration detention.163  Advoca-
cy also focused on the chilling effect on immigrant survivors of violence, for 
whom the police-ICE partnerships purportedly acted as another barrier to access-
ing supportive services from the police.164 
Anti–S-Comm lawmakers and their supporters introduced and passed the 
Trust Act in California, legislation that in its very name called for a restoration of 
the trust between immigrant communities and the police that police-ICE collabo-
ration had theoretically torn asunder.165  The bill drastically limited the situations 
in which local law enforcement would transfer noncitizens from local custody to 
ICE custody on the basis of ICE detainers.166  Law enforcement proved suscepti-
ble to Trust Act advocacy, as one of the primary talking points—that immigrant 
communities should not be discouraged from cooperating with the police—
ultimately served to reinforce police officers’ legitimacy as those most properly 
tasked with protecting and serving their communities.  In other jurisdictions, 
and occasionally within the same jurisdiction, advocates focused not only on 
the police-immigrant trust arguments, but on an opposite argument: Advocates 
warned that having a direct conduit to immigration enforcement created racial 
profiling that led to pretextual arrests of Latinos and others profiled as immi-
grants, as well as their resulting transfer to immigration custody.167 
While the Secure Communities Memo acknowledges the criticisms of the 
S-Comm program, it does not explicitly name troubled relationships between 
  
162. Waslin, supra note 115, at 12.  (“[S-Comm] raises questions about local police authorities’ ability to 
build strong, trusting relationships with their communities.  If a police agency cannot assure its 
immigrant community that there will be no immigration consequences to providing information or 
cooperating with police, immigrants will be less likely to come forward to report crimes, making 
the job of police more difficult.”). 
163. Waslin, supra note 115, at 12. 
164. See Radha Vishnuvajjala, Insecure Communities: How an Immigration Enforcement Program Encourages 
Battered Women to Stay Silent, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 185, 194 (2012). 
165. Assemb. B. 1081, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2011) (“The [S-Comm] program and immigration 
detainers harm community policing efforts because immigrant residents who are victims or witnesses 
to crime, including domestic violence, are less likely to report crime or cooperate with law 
enforcement when any contact with law enforcement could result in deportation.”). 
166. See id. 
167. These arguments were not exclusive to opposition to S-Comm.  S-Comm received disproportionate 
attention as the newest iteration of police-ICE collaboration, but advocates also made similar 
arguments about the effect of the long-active Criminal Alien Program (the low-tech version of S-
Comm) and of the more recent 287(g) agreements (agreements that empowered local law 
enforcement to act as immigration authorities for certain limited purposes).  See Hesson, supra 
note 119. 
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local police and immigrant communities as part of the impetus.  Nevertheless, the 
agency announced a change in detainer policy, clarifying that instead of detainer 
requests, ICE will instead issue requests for notification: “Requests that state or 
local law enforcement notify ICE of a pending release during the time that per-
son is otherwise in custody or under state or local authority.”168  These requests 
presumably will trigger ICE action in picking up the person upon their release. 
Advocates have already begun warning immigrant communities that this 
might translate into ICE rounding up immigrants at the gates of local jails, or 
in their homes and workplaces.169  It remains unclear how local jurisdictions 
will react to the notification requests, but this development mirrors what was 
already occurring in jurisdictions that had refused to detain immigrants for 
ICE.  Attorneys in California, where the Trust Act curtailed local law en-
forcement’s cooperation with detainers, have warned that ICE had already be-
gun adjusting their tactics to the new reality of detainer reform even before the 
announcement of the Executive Actions by targeting noncitizens for arrest and 
detention immediately upon their release from jail.170  In other jurisdictions, ICE 
has used the booking information gleaned from local jails through S-Comm to 
pick up individuals in their own homes.171  The Secure Communities Memo 
thus seems to be ICE’s attempt to implement nationally the strategies it was al-
ready developing locally to make the most of the information gathered from the 
now fully operational information sharing infrastructure S-Comm put in place.  
The tremendous gains that have been made by advocates pushing to alter ICE 
detainer policies will only be maintained if local law enforcement treats detainer 
requests as identical to notification requests, but how jurisdictions will respond 
in practice remains to be seen. 
C. The Deferred Action Memo 
The aspect of the November 2014 Immigration Executive Actions that has 
received the most attention from policymakers, advocates, and the media appears 
in the memo titled, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Indi-
viduals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain 
Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents” 
  
168. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 2. 
169. See, e.g., Organizer Alert: Life After “PEP-Comm”, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. 3 (2015), 
http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ilrc_organizers_advisory-2015-01_06.pdf [http://perma.cc/94 
Y3-U53F] (warning communities of increased ICE presence at “jails, courthouses, and homes”). 
170. Interview with Ann Benson, Directing Attorney, Wash. Def. Ass’n. Immigr. Project (on file with 
author). 
171. Id. 
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(hereinafter Deferred Action Memo).172  This Memo announced an expansion 
of the current Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) program and 
the creation of the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Per-
manent Residents (DAPA) program.173  Estimates vary, but of the approximately 
11 million undocumented persons believed to reside in the United States, ap-
proximately 5 million may qualify to register with the government under either 
DAPA or expanded DACA.174 
In June 2012, DHS announced the creation of the predecessor to this Ex-
ecutive Action, the original DACA.175  Immigration service providers immediate-
ly began preparations to assist eligible immigrant youth in applying for the relief.  
USCIS, the subagency of DHS charged with administering the benefit, had 
received 727,164 applications as of December 31, 2014, denying 38,597 and 
approving 638,897.176  Having learned from the DACA experience, immigrant 
advocates wasted no time after the November 20, 2014, announcement to create 
coalitions focused on preparing for the implementation of the announced pro-
grams.177  Advocates are poised to assist as many individuals as possible in applying 
for the benefits of the expanded DACA and the newly created DAPA, in an at-
tempt to provide protection from deportation to the millions who might qualify.178  
Large grants by foundations are structured to specifically assist in DAPA and ex-
panded DACA implementation, and immigrant legal service providers are pre-
paring for the large increase in workload in processing DAPA and expanded 
DACA applications by recruiting and training volunteers and new staff. 
However, these preparations have been put on hold by a lawsuit filed in fed-
eral district court seeking to stop the implementation of DAPA and expanded 
DACA.179  Twenty-six states joined in the case, Texas v. USA, and on February 
16, 2015, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a tempo-
rary injunction.  The injunction blocked DHS from accepting applications for 
  
172. See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30. 
173. See id. 
174. Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/im 
migrationaction [http://perma.cc/PRT8-ZSY6] (last updated Apr. 15, 2015) (estimating that 4.9 
million undocumented individuals may qualify for relief under DACA and Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)). 
175. See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30. 
176. The rest of the applications remained pending.  See Neufeld Decl. at 10, ¶ 23, Texas v. United 
States, No. 14-CV-254 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015), http://crimmigration.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/01/Neufeld-declaration-1-30-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/9Z9V-AXU7]. 
177. See, e.g., About Administrative Relief, ADMIN. RELIEF RES. CTR., http://www.adminrelief.org/ 
about [http://perma.cc/87MK-2GT8] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
178. See id. 
179. See Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 LEXIS 18551 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015). 
630 63 UCLA L. REV. 594 (2016) 
 
 
the expanded form of DACA (two days before the agency began adjudicating 
them) and blocked DAPA implementation plans from moving forward.180  On 
the government’s appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s refusal to 
lift the preliminary injunction until the case is heard on the merits.181  The De-
partment of Justice has requested that the Supreme Court review the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision to block the implementation of DAPA and Expanded DACA.182  
If the Supreme Court decides the case before June 2016, the Obama Administra-
tion will have a few months to implement the new programs.  If not, Obama's suc-
cessor may decide to either continue pursuing the DAPA and expanded DACA 
or may abandon them altogether.  While the failure of a previous attempt to block 
deferred action through a similar lawsuit in 2012 indicates that the plaintiffs are 
unlikely to prevail in the courts, the delay in implementation caused by the lawsuit 
points to an uncertain future for DAPA and expanded DACA.183 
The fight over the implementation of DAPA and expanded DACA, as well 
as the ongoing preparations to help eligible individuals apply,184 emphasize the 
benefits individuals could receive from these programs.  Detractors consider 
the programs an executive amnesty, while supporters highlight the way the pro-
grams will allow undocumented youth and parents to “come out of the shadows” 
and receive work permits.185  Viewing DAPA and expanded DACA through this 
  
180. See id. 
181. See Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 3386436 (5th Cir. May 26, 2015). 
182. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2015), 
http://immigrationimpact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/US-v.-Texas-Petition.pdf [https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20160105164341/http://immigrationimpact.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
11/US-v.-Texas-Petition.pdf]. 
183. See Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (ICE agents lacked standing to 
bring suit against DHS officials to challenge the constitutional and statutory validity of a directive 
and memorandum promulgated by officials that changed ICE deportation procedures and 
prosecutorial discretion); see also Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Advocates Urge Immigrants Not to Be 
Deterred by Ruling Blocking Obama Plan, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/nationnow/la-na-immigration-lawsuit-applications-daca-dapa-20150217-story.html 
[http://perma.cc/Q65F-NGN8] (reporting that DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson issued a statement in 
response to the preliminary injunction in Texas v. United States, claiming “we fully expect to 
ultimately prevail in the courts, and we will be prepared to implement DAPA and expanded DACA 
once we do”). 
184. See id. 
185. See Marc A. Thiessen, How to Push Back on Obama’s Executive Amnesty, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/marc-thiessen-how-to-push-back-on-obamas-
executive-amnesty/2014/12/01/b1a494f2-7963-11e4-84d4-7c896b90abdc_story.html [http://per 
ma.cc/WBD7-V75E] (characterizing the executive action as “de facto amnesty” and “executive 
amnesty”); see also Eli Saslow, Conservative Expert on Immigration Law to Pursue Suit Against 
Executive Action, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ 
2014/11/22/f6d2b3fe-728a-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html [http://perma.cc/R63B-FN3Z] 
(Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach characterizing the executive action as “imperial, executive 
amnesty” and “[t]he sacrificial shredding of our Constitution”). 
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lens functions to separate the program from the parts of the Executive Actions—
including the Priorities Memo and the Secure Communities Memo—that are 
focused on enforcement.  The Deferred Action Memo itself, however, makes 
clear that enforcement lies at the heart of deferred action; the goal of DAPA and 
expanded DACA is to remove certain persons from ICE and CBP’s crosshairs 
because “DHS and its Components cannot respond to all immigration violations 
or remove all persons illegally in the United States.”186  In other words, the sharp-
ened enforcement that the Priority Memo and the Secure Communities Memo 
establish relies on the Deferred Action Memo: USCIS’s exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion to those deemed deserving is the flipside to the hypercriminalization of 
the millions left out of the protections of DAPA and expanded DACA.  For these 
reasons, an examination of the criminal alien-generating aspects of the Executive 
Actions demands an analysis of DAPA and expanded DACA through an en-
forcement lens. 
1. DAPA and Expanded DACA: Who Qualifies?  
DAPA and expanded DACA, viewed broadly as the Executive Actions’ 
wins for immigrant communities, have the capacity to temporarily move entire 
categories of unauthorized migrants out of ICE’s clutches.187  As a result of these 
programs, two categories of migrants (youth arrivals and parents of U.S. citizens 
and Lawful Permanent Residents) have been deemed unsuitable targets for deten-
tion or deportation for the time being.  The November 2014 Executive Actions 
built upon the original large-scale implementation of prosecutorial discretion by 
the Obama Administration, the June 2012 announcement of the original 
DACA.188  Under the first version of DACA, people who were under the age of 
31 as of June 2012, who had entered the United States under the age of 16, and 
whose entry had occurred before June 15, 2007, could qualify for DACA.189  Ex-
cept for limited circumstances, only those age 15 and over could apply to USCIS, 
and proof of enrollment or graduation from high school or a GED program was 
required.190  The Deferred Action Memo upgraded DACA by removing the age 
cap on the program: under the new program, as long as a person was under the 
age of 16 before they entered, being over the age of 31 would no longer serve to 
  
186. Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 1. 
187. See Lucy Westcott, Undocumented Immigrants and Advocates Welcome Obama’s Executive Action at 
Viewing Party, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/undocumented-immi 
grants-and-advocates-welcome-obamas-executive-action-285997 [http://perma.cc/SG8F-LLYL]. 
188. See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30. 
189. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 38. 
190. See id. 
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disqualify them.191  This change is thought to potentially qualify 300,000 more 
individuals for the program.192 
The primary benefits of expanded DACA are a three-year award of work 
authorization and the knowledge that for those three years, the DACA recipient 
will not be a priority for deportation—that is, unless she comes into contact with 
the criminal system and triggers one of the categories in the Priorities Memo.193  
The work authorization document qualifies an individual for a social security 
number, and allows the DACA recipient access to employment and educational 
opportunities previously closed to her, as well as the possibility of travel outside the 
country if she receives advance permission to return.194  DACA recipients are 
considered lawfully present, but, as the memo makes clear, DACA is not a 
legal status, and confers “no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to 
citizenship.”195 
DAPA provides the same benefits, but rather than qualifying individuals 
on the basis of their childhood arrivals in the United States, DAPA’s benefits ac-
crue to those unauthorized migrants who have U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent 
Resident children.196  Like recipients of expanded DACA, applicants must 
have resided in the United States since January 1, 2010.197  The factors that 
disqualify individuals from receiving DAPA and expanded DACA are slightly 
different, but both programs would disqualify those convicted of a broad range of 
criminal offenses.198  The disqualifying factors for DAPA demonstrate the close 
  
191. Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 3. 
192. President Obama’s Immigration Announcement, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR. (Nov. 26, 2014), http:// 
www.nilc.org/execactionsummary.html [http://perma.cc/J7T5-2W53] (estimating approximately 
300,000 will qualify under the expanded version of DACA). 
193. As explained infra, detention and deportation can still occur if the DACA recipient has an encounter 
with law enforcement. 
194. See Social Security Number and Card—Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9QM-G74Z] (last visited Jan. 5, 
2015) (Social Security Number eligibility under DACA); see also Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-
act ion-childhood-arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions [http://perma.cc/NE2L-4FZZ] 
(last updated June 15, 2015) (ability to travel outside United States under DACA). 
195. Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 5. 
196. See id. at 4. 
197. See id.  
198. See id. at 3; see also Practice Advisory for Criminal Defenders: New “Deferred Action for Parental 
Accountability” (DAPA) Immigration Program Announced by President Obama, IMMIGRANT LEGAL 
RES. CTR. & NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD 1 (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/practice_advisories/pa_ar-dapa-criminal 
-defender-advisory-11_25_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/XZE9-29E5] (“Both DAPA and DACA 
are barred by conviction of any felony, a ‘significant’ misdemeanor, or three misdemeanors.  
However, even here there are differences, for example in the definition of what constitutes a 
felony and misdemeanor.”); Understanding the Criminal Bars to the Deferred Action Policy for 
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connection between the Priorities Memo and the Deferred Action Memo.  Ra-
ther than list out the disqualifying factors individually, the Deferred Action 
Memo directly incorporates the Priorities Memo, stating that individuals who 
“are not an enforcement priority as reflected in the November 20, 2014 Policies 
for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants 
Memorandum” may be eligible for DAPA.199  As explained in Part I.A, supra, 
the significant misdemeanor category, first created as a disqualifying factor for 
the original DACA, reappears in the Priorities Memo, and thus is also integrat-
ed into the structure of DAPA. 
2. DAPA and Expanded DACA in Context: The Executive’s Back-End 
Power Over Immigration 
Analyzing the links between DAPA and expanded DACA and the im-
migration enforcement regime requires a consideration of the ways in which 
the delegation of immigration authority to the Executive Branch contributes to 
these links.  The prevailing wisdom holds that Congress, through its authority 
over the creation and expansion of the immigration code, decides the categories 
of immigrants allowed to enter and remain in the United States.200  However, as 
tracked by Cristina Rodriguez and Adam Cox, the expansion of the immigra-
tion code by Congress has “had the counterintuitive consequences of delegating 
tremendous authority to the President to set immigration screening policy by 
making a huge fraction of noncitizens deportable at the option of the Execu-
tive.”201  Because millions of noncitizens are deportable at the option of the 
President, this functionally gives the Executive Branch the power “to exert con-
trol over the number and types of immigrants inside the United States.”202  This 
power is exercised at the back end of the system, “through the exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion with respect to whom to deport, rather than at the front end of 
the system, through decisions about whom to admit.”203  This “de facto delega-
tion” ends up giving the Executive “vast discretion to shape immigration policy by 
  
Childhood Arrivals, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (Oct. 2012), http://www.ilrc.org/files/ 
documents/ilrcunderstanding_criminal_bars_to_deferred_action_5.pdf [http://perma.cc/D4EQ-V 
9HH] (discussing applicable criminal convictions under DACA). 
199. Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 4. 
200. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)) (finding that over no area is the legislative power more complete than 
immigration). 
201. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 
463 (2009). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 464. 
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deciding how (and over which types of immigrants) to exercise the option to de-
port.”204  This power has been concentrated in ICE officials, who are responsible 
for deciding whom to detain and charge as removable.205 
The November 2014 Executive Actions appear designed to further con-
solidate this authority.  The Priorities Memo clarifies whom ICE will target, 
and the Deferred Action Memo outlines the parameters of whom will be 
spared.  It makes no difference that DAPA and expanded DACA will be man-
aged through USCIS, the branch of the immigration authority that grants bene-
fits; the population-level exercise of prosecutorial discretion nonetheless shapes 
the form and size of the undocumented population in the United States at the 
whim of the President.  The line between USCIS and ICE is a fluid one.  The 
threat of handing over rejected DAPA and expanded DACA applications to 
ICE for enforcement remains present, and, more importantly, those who do not 
or cannot apply for these programs will be more firmly under ICE’s purview. 
Moreover, by creating the significant misdemeanor ground, discussed in 
Part I.A, supra, the President is further shoring up immigration power in the Ex-
ecutive.  There is no statutory basis (and thus no legislative review or approval) of 
the category, but it nonetheless creates a new group of appropriate “criminal al-
ien” targets for deportation.  This expansion of categories of appropriately de-
portable noncitizens is the flipside of the creation of DAPA and expanded 
DACA, programs that carve out a less appropriately deportable segment of the 
noncitizen population. 
3. DACA and DAPA Theorized 
The original creation of DACA in 2012 and its expansion in November 2014 
provided a lifeline for the immigrant youth who have organized since 2001 for 
the passage of successive versions of the DREAM Act, a bill that would pro-
vide lawful status for noncitizen youth.206  The original DACA program falls 
far short of the promises of the DREAM Act, and is considered by many to 
be a placeholder until the bill can win passage, either as a standalone bill or as 
part of a broader comprehensive immigration reform package.  Although it is not 
  
204. Id. at 511. 
205. See id. at 519. 
206. See Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001) (the 
first DREAM Act introduced in 2001); Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act 
of 2003, S. 1545, 108th Cong. (2003) (the second attempt at the DREAM Act); Development, 
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2007, S. 2205, 110th Cong. (2007) (the third 
attempt at the DREAM Act); see also Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 
729, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009). 
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the DREAM Act, much of the framing of DACA closely mirrors that sur-
rounding DREAM Act advocacy.207 
Amalia Pallares has laid out what she calls the “neoliberal rationality” that has 
prevailed in public discussion of the DREAM Act, which stands in contrast with 
immigrant youth advocacy centering community, family, fairness, and equality.208  
The same neoliberal rationality is in full view in the official narratives around the 
creation and now expansion of DACA.  DACA recipients emerge as the ideal ne-
oliberal actors: framed as exceptional, required to perform the myth of self-
reliance, driven to show that they are self-propelled and can achieve their own 
economic viability, and exempting the state and private industry from social sup-
port.209  The federal government has made clear that DACA recipients’ inde-
pendence must be absolute—they do not qualify for medical insurance through 
the Affordable Care Act, nor do they qualify for federal financial aid that might 
assist them.210  Despite having to go it alone, they are also valued for their potential 
economic contributions.  The President highlighted this valorization of immi-
grant youths’ latent productivity, seamlessly linking it to American exceptionalism 
in his November 21st remarks supporting the November 20th Executive Actions:  
We’re constantly being replenished with strivers who believe in the 
American Dream.  And it gives us a tremendous advantage over other 
nations.  It makes us entrepreneurial.  It continues the promise that 
here in America, you can make it if you try, regardless of where you 
come from, regardless of the circumstances of your birth.211   
As projected through the DACA program, immigrant youth are simultaneously 
valued for their ability to advance without assistance and for their potential eco-
nomic contributions—contributions that would generate more pure profit for the 
United States given that these youth will have to subsidize their own advanced 
schooling and healthcare. 
  
207. This Part is animated by the insights of political scientist Amalia Pallares, in her close examination 
of the framing of DREAM Act advocacy in her book, AMALIA PALLARES, FAMILY ACTIVISM: 
IMMIGRANT STRUGGLES AND THE POLITICS OF NONCITIZENSHIP (2015). 
208. Id. at 104. 
209. See id. at 106. 
210. See Immigration Status and the Marketplace, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/ 
immigrants/immigration-status [https://perma.cc/VW8D-8DAV] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) 
(clarifying that recipients of DACA do not qualify for the Affordable Care Act “Marketplace”); see 
also Questions and Answers: Financial Aid and Undocumented Students, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (May 
2014), https://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/financial-aid-and-undocumented-students.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R9VH-QSQF] (clarifying that DACA students are not eligible for federal 
financial aid). 
211. Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24. 
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While the rationales surrounding DACA appear to valorize the potential of 
its recipients as individual advancers of American exceptionalism, DAPA occupies 
a different niche.  In one respect, the creation of DAPA falls squarely in line with 
the historical valorization of family reunification in U.S. immigration law and pol-
icy.212  At least since the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
“there has been an immigration norm that prioritizes family reunification in cases 
of family members abroad, and family unity in cases of families who reside in the 
United States.”213  While more recent changes in immigration law have drastically 
increased deportations and curtailed options for legalization, family unity remains, 
at least in theory, one of the pillars of the immigration system. 
The focus on family unity, however, does not value all families equally.  
DAPA valorizes the unity of families that include U.S. citizen or Lawful Per-
manent Resident children.  For families that do not include U.S.-born children, 
the principle of family unity seems not to apply, as evinced by the exclusion of par-
ents of DACA recipients from eligibility for relief.  This can be linked to the way 
that DAPA valorizes innocence.  Whereas with DACA the innocence of immi-
grant youth who came to the United States “through no fault of their own” is cen-
tered, DAPA valorizes the innocence of U.S.-born children who are not to blame 
for their parents’ action.  By offering protection from deportation to their parents, 
these U.S.-born children are protected.  Their birth in the United States appears 
to trump their parents’ wrongdoing, and their potential suffering (in the case 
of their parents’ deportation) counts in a way that the suffering of an undocu-
mented youth (or even a DACA recipient) losing a parent to deportation does 
not.  The value of DAPA applicants thus lies in part in their role as the creators 
and caretakers of that most valuable form of life—U.S. bodies born on U.S. soil. 
This selective focus on family unity is particularly stark given the current 
expansion of “family detention”—a euphemism for the incarceration of immi-
grant women with their young children during the pendency of their removal 
proceedings.214  Those detained in family detention centers primarily consist of 
  
212. For an in-depth overview of the historical recognition of family in immigration and citizenship law, 
see Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 655–64 
(2014). 
213. PALLARES, supra note 207, at 25. 
214. See, e.g., ICE’s New Family Detention Center in Dilley, Texas to Open in December, U.S. IMMIGR. & 
CUSTOMS ENF’T (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ices-new-family-deten 
tion-center-dilley-texas-open-december [https://perma.cc/2PGJ-5PMG] (“The South Texas 
Residential Center in Dilley is the fourth facility the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
has used to increase its capacity to detain and expedite the removal of adults with children who 
illegally crossed the Southwest border.”). 
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recent arrivals apprehended while attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border.215  
Their recent arrival marks them as ineligible for the potential protections of 
DAPA or DACA.216  The dire conditions at the Artesia, New Mexico family de-
tention facility, where the average age of children was 6.5 years old,217 involved 
grossly inadequate healthcare, educational support, and legal support.218  Attor-
neys visiting their clients described sick, malnourished children and desperate 
mothers housed in barracks reminiscent of the Japanese internment camps.219  
While the Artesia facility has now closed, it has been replaced by the largest im-
migration detention center in the United States in Dilley, Texas, designed to 
house exclusively women and their children, with a capacity of 2400 migrants.220 
The simultaneous expansion in the use of criminal alien requirement (CAR) 
facilities—federal prisons housing exclusively immigrants, mostly men who are 
prosecuted for either entering or reentering the United States unlawfully—
completes this picture.221  The estimated 90,000 deportations of parents each year 
translate increasingly into criminal convictions for illegal reentry for many of those 
who attempt to return.222  A recent study found that the risk of incarceration does 
not deter those trying to return to their family members, guaranteeing a contin-
ued pool of bodies for the privately owned CAR prisons.223  During his an-
nouncement of the Executive Actions, the President asked, “Are we a nation that 
  
215. Id.; see also, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, FAMILY IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION: WHY THE PAST CANNOT BE PROLOGUE (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/FINAL%20ABA%20Family%20D
etention%20Report%208-19-15.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/AMZ5-R4L9] (analyzing 
the U.S. government's decision, as a policy matter, to detain women and children fleeing to the 
United States to seek protection). 
216. See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 4 (requiring individuals to have arrived before January 
1, 2010, in order to qualify for DAPA or expanded DACA relief). 
217. Vicki B. Gaubeca, Stop Warehousing Immigrant Mothers and Children, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL 
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218. Expose and Close, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK (Sept. 2014), http://www.detentionwatch 
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220. Julia Preston, Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-security-chief-opens-largest-
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221. Warehoused and Forgotten, ACLU 2–3 (June 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assetcs/ 
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accepts the cruelty of ripping children from their parents’ arms?”224  The expan-
sion of CAR facilities to house those attempting to return to their families seems 
to answer this question in the affirmative.  The valuing of family unity that 
DAPA purports to advance must be theorized alongside the two attacks on the 
family that family detention and CAR facilities represent. 
DAPA’s justification is not limited to family unity.  The value of immi-
grant parents as laborers appears central as well.  Obama alluded to this in his 
November 20th speech, asking, “Are we a nation that tolerates the hypocrisy of a 
system where workers who pick our fruit and make our beds never have a chance 
to get right with the law?  Or are we a nation that gives them a chance to make 
amends, take responsibility, and give their kids a better future?”225  In contrast to 
the DACA-eligible youth, who appear to be valued for their potential contribu-
tions as America’s future producers, potential DAPA recipients are naturalized 
both as caretakers of America’s future entrepreneurs, and as the workers at the 
lowest ranks of the segmented labor market.226  Writing in 2009 about the Pres-
ident’s relationship to immigration law, Adam B. Cox and Cristina M. 
Rodríguez foreshadowed this aspect of the Executive Actions, explaining that 
the delegation of power on the enforcement side of immigration policy makes it 
possible for the President, “without having to resort to the legislative process, to 
alter significantly the composition of the immigrant labor force.”227  Thus, under 
DAPA, the most malleable laborers would be given permission to stay, while the 
rest are hypercriminalized and drawn into the detention to deportation pipeline. 
The narratives around innocence, exceptionalism, and family unity that 
bolster DAPA and both the original and the expanded DACA programs also 
serve to mask the underlying policies that have resulted in an undocumented pop-
ulation of 11 million.  At their core, DACA and DAPA are prosecutorial discre-
tion programs, or attempts by the federal government to provide a case-by-case 
evaluation of eligible individuals.  The collective demands of immigrants are both 
masked and nullified by the individualized forms of prosecutorial discretion that 
DACA and DAPA represent.  The worthiness of each applicant’s capacities and 
productive potential, either as laborers and protectors of U.S. citizen or Lawful 
Permanent Resident children (DAPA) or potential producers (DACA and ex-
panded DACA) are grounded in a neoliberal perspective that measures each 
applicant against the pre-approved narratives.  While the decision to migrate is 
a personal one, the factors pushing individuals to attempt unauthorized crossings 
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into the United States, and to remain in the United States if they cross suc-
cessfully, are not.  For example, the displacement of Mexican workers occasioned 
by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),228 the land-grab-fueled 
displacement of migrants from South America,229 and the poverty and gang vio-
lence leading to the so-called surge in Central American migrants’ arrivals during 
the summer of 2014,230 are all masked by a rhetoric that views migration as an in-
dividual choice with individual, at-fault actors.  The millions of potential individu-
al exercises of prosecutorial discretion through DAPA and expanded DACA cast 
a huge web of obfuscation over the root causes of migratory flows.  As explained 
below, they also serve to mask the unhampered growth of the immigration en-
forcement apparatus, of which these programs are an integral part. 
4. DAPA and Expanded DACA and the Production of the “Criminal Alien” 
Generally speaking, the unauthorized migrants who might have thus far 
avoided the immigration enforcement apparatus and the criminal justice system 
are those most likely to submit their detailed applications to USCIS if the pro-
grams move forward.  If they are properly informed, unauthorized migrants are 
unlikely to apply for DAPA or expanded DACA if they have criminal convictions 
that disqualify them from the relief and simultaneously make them priorities for 
detention and removal.231  Immigrant advocacy organizations are attempting to 
assure this outcome by offering preliminary public education about DAPA and 
expanded DACA’s disqualifying factors, in the hopes of bringing down the num-
ber of people who will submit their information to USCIS without the guarantee 
of the promised benefit.232  The vast majority of those who submitted applications 
  
228. See DAVID BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: HOW GLOBALIZATION CREATES MIGRATION AND 
CRIMINALIZES IMMIGRANTS (2008). 
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(2014). 
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ral-america-to-u-s [http://perma.cc/7W7Q-YU9W] (observing drastic increases in Honduran 
and Salvadoran child migration in response to surges in gang and drug trafficking violence). 
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and State Profile of Youth Eligible and Applying for Deferred Action, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 5 
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rofile-youth-eligible-and-applying-deferred-action [http://perma.cc/QT2R-PBWA]. 
232. See, e.g., Understanding the Criminal Bars to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, IMMIGRANT 
LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (2012), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ilrc-2012-daca_chart_1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/J3AN-VT9R] (providing a brief overview of how criminal history affects eligibility 
for deferred action as a reference for applicants). 
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to USCIS for the original DACA program qualified for the benefit,233 and the 
same could be true of the enhanced DACA and the new DAPA if individuals re-
ceive accurate information and competent assistance with the application process. 
The process of applying for deferred action involves the submission of a de-
tailed form with extensive biographic data; the forms created for the first iteration 
of DACA asked applicants to list every single address at which they have resided 
since they arrived in the United States.234  More importantly, every person who 
applies for DAPA or expanded DACA would be subject to a background check.  
Upon submission of an application to USCIS, migrants would receive a notice 
directing them to a biometrics capture appointment at their nearest USCIS 
office.235  For many applicants whose survival has thus far depended on avoiding 
detection by immigration authorities, this appointment will be the first time they 
willingly enter a federal immigration facility.  At the appointment, the applicants’ 
fingerprints and photographs will be taken.236  The background check is carried 
out by running the fingerprints against available federal criminal and immigration 
databases in an attempt to flag disqualifying factors such as past criminal records, 
past deportations, or both.237  If the initial round of DACA applications are any 
indication, most applicants will presumably clear this hurdle. 
The captured biometric data will be used for purposes other than just a 
background check, however.  The information will enter the Automatic Biometric 
Identification System (IDENT), a database that serves as “a central DHS-wide 
system for storage and processing of biometric and associated biographic infor-
mation for national security; law enforcement; immigration and border man-
agement; intelligence; background investigations for national security positions 
  
233. This was clearly the case with the first iteration of deferred action (DACA), with a ratio of 638,897 
applications approved to 38,597 denied.  The rest of the applications remained pending.  See Neufeld 
Decl., supra note 176. 
234. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Form I-821D: Consideration of Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. 2–3, http://www.uscis.gov/sites/ 
default/files/files/form/i-821d.pdf [http://perma.cc/769Z-TM8E] (form last updated June 4, 
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provide fingerprints, photographs, and signatures (biometrics).  You may receive a notice scheduling 
you to appear at an Application Support Center (ASC) for biometrics collection.”). 
236. Id. 
237. See Privacy Impact Assessment Update for the Customer Identity Verification (CIV) System, U.S. DEP’T. 
OF HOMELAND SEC. 3 (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ 
uscis_civupdate.pdf [http://perma.cc/C3GR-2LQQ] (detailing the background fingerprint-check 
procedure). 
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and certain positions of public trust; and associated testing, training, manage-
ment reporting, planning and analysis, or other administrative uses.”238  IDENT 
bridges the enforcement aspects and the benefits-granting aspects of the agen-
cy’s work by holding the records of all noncitizens fingerprinted by DHS, 
whether they have been encountered for detention or deportation purposes, or for 
purposes of obtaining lawful immigration status.239  All DAPA and expanded 
DACA applicants’ information would be entered in IDENT and remain in the 
database, past the expiration of the three-year deferred action period or the pro-
grams’ cancellation under future presidential administrations. 
The potential capture of the data of millions of DAPA and expanded 
DACA recipients in the IDENT database takes on particular weight when ana-
lyzed alongside the federal government’s complete integration of IDENT into ef-
forts to apprehend and deport “criminal aliens.”  The full activation of S-Comm in 
every jurisdiction translates into any arrest of any person, citizen or noncitizen, 
anywhere in the country, triggering a check against the fingerprints in the 
IDENT database.240  As discussed in Part I.B, supra, this aspect of S-Comm will 
remain unchanged in the newly created PEP.  Most of those who apply for 
DAPA and expanded DAPA would do so because they have no path to lawful 
status in the United States.  For those who managed to cross into the country 
without encountering any border enforcement officials or without having been 
fingerprinted or photographed by those officials, no record of their existence cur-
rently resides within federal immigration databases.241  If they were arrested by 
local law enforcement, a search of the IDENT database would not reveal their 
noncitizen status.  Unless they are flagged as noncitizens some other way (for ex-
ample, through an in-person interview conducted pursuant to the Criminal Alien 
  
238. See Privacy Impact Assessment for the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), U.S. 
DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. 2 (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publicat 
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unauthorized migrants—are believed to have entered without inspection at a port of entry.”). 
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Program), they may be able to go through the criminal process without being 
flagged for transferred to ICE custody.242 
Now, however, any future encounters with law enforcement by DAPA or 
expanded DACA recipients, whose data would then be in IDENT, could lead to 
quick identification by immigration enforcement authorities and transfer to im-
migration custody.  To avoid detection, DAPA and expanded DACA recipients 
would need to remain above reproach in every area of their lives, a task that could 
prove impossible for people of color, especially young men who may attract police 
attention despite their best efforts to perform DAPA or expanded DACA levels 
of respectability.243 
In the worst case scenario for this population, a future administration may 
choose not only to cancel the deferred action programs, but to use the infor-
mation in IDENT to track down, detain, and deport those who have made their 
presence known through their DAPA or expanded DACA applications.244  This 
may prove politically unpopular, particularly if millions of individuals end up ap-
plying for and receiving these forms of relief.  However, the mass deportations of 
Operation Wetback in the 1950s (which included the rounding up of over a mil-
lion people, including U.S. citizens of Mexican descent) demonstrate that this 
outcome, while likely to prove controversial, is not politically impossible.245 
This is not an argument for the millions who may qualify for deferred action 
to remain in the shadows if the program moves forward.  The decision of whether 
or not to apply for DAPA or expanded DACA, even if one unquestionably quali-
fies for the relief, is a highly personal one.  Coming out of the shadows to be 
counted and accounted for, however, while it may bring the benefits of work au-
thorization and a social security number, involves stepping into the potential net of 
immigration enforcement.  Voluntary entry into the IDENT database (one of the 
primary mechanisms for producing “criminal aliens”) at a time when detention 
  
242. Ingrid Eagly has tracked how local jurisdictions may handle knowledge of an arrestee’s lack of U.S. 
citizenship differently depending on local attitudes toward unauthorized migration, with some 
jurisdictions actively seeking to use this information to initiate immigration enforcement efforts, and 
others seeking to ignore it.  Eagly, supra note 10. 
243. See Carbado & Harris, supra note 16 (arguing that the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio and United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce effectively enables procedural racial profiling). 
244. But see Motomura, supra note 241, at 1853–54 (“[T]he combination of the Gonzales rule, § 287(g) 
agreements, and [S-Comm] can give the federal government more information about potentially 
removable individuals than the federal enforcement apparatus can handle—either politically given 
various constituencies opposed to certain types of enforcement, or practically given its limited 
capacity.”). 
245. See U.S. IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV. ANN. REP., at 31 (1954).; see also Giberto 
Cardenas, United States Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An Historical Perspective, 2 CHICANO L. 
REV. 66, 81 (1975) (finding that during 1950s, as many as one-sixth of the total “Mexican-origin” 
population in the United States was deported). 
Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm 643 
 
 
and deportation are at an all-time high is a required tradeoff for the temporary 
protections of DAPA or expanded DACA. 
II. NET WIDENING IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT 
The excesses of the carceral state have pierced public consciousness, and law 
enforcement officials now routinely make pronouncements about the need to re-
consider the strategies that have led the United States to become the world’s lead-
ing jailer.246  By contrast, in the immigration realm, the unprecedented resources 
applied to both border and interior enforcement and the growth in detention 
have not yet reached politically unpalatable levels.247  Still, the two million depor-
tations benchmark surpassed by the Obama Administration in April 2014 gener-
ated a great deal of activism and backlash against the Executive’s enforcement 
strategy.248  When the head of the National Council of La Raza, historically a 
supporter of the Obama Administration, publicly called the President the “De-
porter-in-Chief,” the President could no longer ignore the crisis.249 
  
246. See, e.g., U.S. Attorney Gen. Eric Holder, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar 
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar-associations [http://perma.cc/ 
UTV7-JQ8Q] (acknowledging that “young black and Latino men are disproportionately likely to 
become involved in our criminal justice system” and that “people of color often face harsher 
punishment than their peers”); see also FBI Dir. James B. Comey, Remarks to Georgetown 
University (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement-and-
race [https: //perma.cc/ZTJ7-8W55] (FBI Director James Comey recognized “hard truths” in the 
aftermath of the fatal shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.  Comey acknowledged 
that “at many points in American history, law enforcement enforced the status quo, a status quo that 
was often brutally unfair to disfavored groups. . . . [R]esearch points to the widespread existence of 
unconscious [racial bias.]”); Jesse McKinley, Pat Robertson Says Marijuana Use Should be Legal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/us/pat-robertson-backs-legalizing-
marijuana.html [http://perma.cc/L79Z-3X3T] (evangelical leader Pat Robertson advocating for 
drug law revision, stating, “It’s completely out of control . . . prisons are being overcrowded with 
juvenile offenders having to do with drugs. And the penalties, the maximums, some of them could 
get 10 years for possession of a joint of marijuana.  It makes no sense at all”). 
247. See The Growth of the U.S. Deportation Machine, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. fig. 2 (Apr. 9, 2014), http://ww 
w.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/growth-us-deportation-machine [http://perma.cc/NC5C-XEL 
7] (graph of U.S. Border Patrol Budget, FY 1993–2013); see also Graff, supra note 151 (examining 
the increase of Border Patrol budgets in comparison to the combined budgets of the FBI, ATF, 
DEA, Secret Service and U.S. Marshals). 
248. Editorial, Mr. Obama Feels the Heat, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/0 
3/15/opinion/mr-obama-feels-the-heat.html [http://perma.cc/XR25-ZNA2] (“An escalating 
campaign by immigration advocates against President Obama’s get-tough policies (nearly two 
million deportations and counting) is having an effect on the deporter in chief.”). 
249. See Eyder Peralta, National Council of La Raza Dubs Obama ‘Deporter-in-Chief’, NPR (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/04/285907255/national-council-of-la-raza-dubs-o 
bama-deporter-in-chief [http://perma.cc/4CJS-B5UD]. 
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Possibly hoping to relieve public pressure against deportations, the Execu-
tive acted, announcing the November 2014 Immigration Accountability Executive 
Actions.  In this context, the November 2014 announcement can be seen as the 
President’s best effort to fix some of what is considered broken in the immigration 
system.250  Nevertheless, even as the expansion of DACA and creation of DAPA 
indicate a rejection of an indiscriminate deportation strategy, the massive underly-
ing mechanisms of immigration enforcement survive in both new and refined 
forms.251  These forms include the creation of new criminal alien categories like 
the significant misdemeanor,252 the rebranding of S-Comm into PEP,253 and the 
addition to the IDENT database of all of those who apply for DAPA or expanded 
DACA.254  The broad powers of the immigration enforcement apparatus remain 
intact, and their differential impacts on the “criminal alien” remain unchanged.255  
While the Executive Actions did expand the population of immigrants who may 
be protected from deportation, the three Memos examined in the preceding sec-
tions may have the effect of widening the nets of social control over the noncitizen 
population. 
Net widening is a phenomenon associated with forms of penal reform that 
function to expand state control over an ever-growing criminal justice popula-
tion.256  “The criminal justice system can be conceptualized as a net or series of nets 
functioning to regulate and control personal behavior.  Each component of the 
justice system . . . is authorized by the state to intervene in our personal lives.”257  
The term net widening has been applied where the reformers’ intentions are frus-
trated by the unintended consequences of widening, strengthening, or creating 
  
250. See President Barack Obama, supra note 2 (“But today, our immigration system is broken—and 
everybody knows it . . . When I took office, I committed to fixing this broken immigration system . . . 
[T]here are actions I have the legal authority to take as President—the same kinds of actions taken 
by Democratic and Republican presidents before me—that will help make our immigration system 
more fair and more just.  Tonight I am announcing those actions.”). 
251.  See Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1104 (arguing that decriminalization alters and strengthens the penal 
system’s powers of governance and control and concluding that “by rejecting the overtly punitive and 
costly policies of mass incarceration, it permits the massive underlying mechanism to survive in new 
forms”). 
252. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
253. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
254. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
255. Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1104. 
256. See Austin & Krisberg, supra note 31, at 169 (“The criminal justice system can be conceptualized as a 
net or series of nets functioning to regulate and control personal behavior.  Each component of the 
justice system . . . is authorized by the state to intervene . . . .”).  In the following sections, this Author 
will apply the concept of net widening to the immigration context. 
257. Id. at 169. 
Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm 645 
 
 
new nets of social control.258  As explained by James Austin and Barry Krisberg 
in their formative article on the topic, (i) reforms that increase the number of 
subgroups in society whose behavior is regulated and controlled by the state cre-
ate wider nets; (ii) reforms that increase the state’s capacity to control individuals 
through intensifying state intervention create stronger nets; and (iii) reforms that 
transfer intervention authority from one agency or control system to another cre-
ate new nets.259  While the net widening critique was originally developed in the 
penal reform context, applying it to the immigration Executive Actions offers 
valuable insights and suggests new directions for future reform efforts. 
A. The Executive Actions Create Wider Nets 
The creation and consolidation of the significant misdemeanor category 
creates wider nets by expanding the pool of people who are properly labeled crim-
inal aliens.  As discussed in Part I.B, supra, DUIs already constituted the most 
common criminal conviction for deportees (after the immigration crime of illegal 
entry).  The explicit inclusion of the DUI as a significant misdemeanor nonethe-
less constitutes a form of net widening, as the immigration enforcement system is 
now expanding in name to reflect—and continue to justify—the expansion in 
practice.  Individuals with DUI convictions and other misdemeanor convictions 
will continue to be identified through the criminal system and transferred to de-
tention centers.  The consolidation of the significant misdemeanor transforms 
the action of driving while intoxicated into an identity (“criminal alien”).  The 
consequence is that noncitizens with a single DUI conviction will continue to 
face the full force of the detention and deportation apparatus. 
Apart from the expansion of categories in the Priorities Memo, the ex-
panded biometric capture required as part of DAPA and expanded DACA im-
plementation can also be theorized as creating wider nets.  DAPA and expanded 
DACA would create a new entry point for the IDENT database, as discussed in 
Part I.C, supra.260  These wider nets are part of what immigration scholar Anil 
Kalhan describes as “immigration panopticism,” 
  
258. Id. at 176–77 (analyzing partial decriminalization movements in marijuana laws creating 
correspondent increases in other areas of law enforcement such as narcotics offenses); see also 
Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1095 (arguing that decriminalization efforts such as drug courts and other 
partial decriminalization programs actually widen the criminal justice net by increasing “the numbers 
of offenders routed into the criminal system”). 
259. See Austin & Krisberg, supra note 31, at 170. 
260. See Privacy Impact Assessment Update for the Customer Identity Verification (CIV) System, U.S. DEP’T. 
OF HOMELAND SEC. 3 (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_ 
pia_uscis_civupdate.pdf [http://perma.cc/C3GR-2LQQ] (detailing the background fingerprint-
check procedure); see also Privacy Impact Assessment for the Automated Biometric Identification System 
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which eliminates zones in society where immigration status is invisible 
and irrelevant and puts large numbers of public and private actors—
including law enforcement and criminal justice officials . . . in the posi-
tion of monitoring and determining immigration status, identifying 
potential immigration law violators, collecting personal information 
from those individuals, and informing federal authorities.261 
Many DAPA and expanded DACA applicants will have thus far managed 
to avoid capture by the immigration authorities.262  If the programs move for-
ward, with no better options in sight, DAPA and expanded DACA applicants 
will willingly submit their biometrics information to DHS, signing up for height-
ened surveillance by immigration enforcement agencies.263  While deferred action 
may be a signal that the President is rejecting the fiscal and human cost of indis-
criminate deportations, it maintains mechanisms of tracking, labeling, and con-
trol over a disfavored population (noncitizens) over the long term. 
Whether the information in IDENT is used for a future mass deportation 
program, or simply for the current person-by-person arrest of those noncitizens 
who come into contact with the criminal system, the addition of millions of 
previously uncounted migrants into IDENT widens nets by increasing the state’s 
capacity to control migrants.  Because IDENT contains the information of every-
one who has come into contact with DHS’s immigration branches, it cannot be 
said to be a criminal database.264  This distinction may be considered meaningless, 
as inclusion in IDENT, because of its full integration into local criminal enforce-
ment efforts, marks everyone in the database as a potential “criminal alien,” and 
thus a potential subject of immigration enforcement.265  Because those who go on 
to become Lawful Permanent Residents nonetheless remain in IDENT, the da-
tabase’s reach extends far into the future, marking anyone who has ever been a 
noncitizen as a potential candidate for detention or deportation.  For those whose 
  
(IDENT), U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. 2 (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default 
/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_appendixj_jan2013.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/WXL9-VYUU] (detailing procedure for IDENT checks). 
261. Kalhan, supra note 117, at 1145. 
262. Approximately 6.7 million unauthorized migrants in the United States are thought to have entered 
the United States without inspection by immigration authorities.  While some percentage of these 
individuals may have had at least one encounter with border authorities or other agents of DHS, 
many will have avoided all contact with immigration authorities.  See Motomura, supra note 241, at 
1828. 
263. As explained in Part I.C, submitting biometrics information is part of the application process for 
DAPA and expanded DACA. 
264. For an explanation of IDENT procedures, see generally Privacy Impact Assessment for the Automated 
Biometric Identification System (IDENT), supra note 238. 
265. See Secure Communities: Monthly Statistics Through August 31, 2014 IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability, 
supra note 240. 
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data is held in IDENT, only attaining U.S. citizenship (and the protection from 
deportation citizenship offers) erases the potential for detention and deportation. 
B. The Executive Actions Create Stronger Nets 
The Executive has repeatedly made it clear that DAPA and expanded 
DACA would not grant recipients lawful status; it merely deprioritizes them for 
deportation.266  In this sense, for those who receive deferred action, this decrimi-
nalization in ICE’s eyes is in some way a tradeoff for their continued unlawful 
status.  In other words, by applying for deferred action, unauthorized migrants 
make themselves known to immigration authorities without suffering the usual 
outcomes of detention and deportation, and successful applicants are diverted into 
the three-year period of DAPA or expanded DACA.267 
This tradeoff in the form of DAPA and expanded DAPA may have a 
net-widening effect by increasing immigration enforcement against other 
populations.  In the criminal realm, initial attempts to decriminalize marijuana 
were criticized as having the effect of “widening and toughening the net in 
other areas of law enforcement,” leading to increased arrest of persons com-
mitting other drug-related offenses.268  In the immigration realm, the removal 
of DAPA and expanded DACA recipients as short-term enforcement priori-
ties could also lead to the “widening and toughening” of the net in other areas 
of immigration enforcement, providing political cover for the expansion in the 
use of detention and border enforcement resources.269 
An example of how this net widening of targeted migrant populations could 
occur takes place in the family detention context.  Since 2007, the congressional 
budget has included a mandate that 34,000 immigration detention beds be funded 
  
266. See Deferred Action Memo, supra note 30, at 5 (“This memorandum confers no substantive right, 
immigration status, or pathway to citizenship.”); see also Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA), supra note 38 (“Deferred action is a use of prosecutorial discretion to defer removal 
action against an individual for a certain period of time.  Deferred action does not provide lawful 
status.”). 
267. Other ways of theorizing the spectrum of non-U.S. citizenship statuses include “twilight status” 
and “liminal status.” See David A. Martin, Twilight Statuses: A Closer Examination of the 
Unauthorized Population, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (2005), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
pubs/MPI_PB_6.05.pdf [http://perma.cc/E99F-GGL4] (categorizing the various statuses of 
the undocumented population); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration Detention: No Turning 
Back?, in S. ATLANTIC Q. 113:3 9 (Summer 2014) (discussing the vulnerability of noncitizens 
who are in a “liminal status”). 
268. Austin & Krisberg, supra note 31, at 177. 
269. Id.  
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on any given night.270  Anti-detention advocates refer to this funding mandate as 
the “bed quota,” drawing attention to its absolute uniqueness; in no other realm 
of the U.S. carceral state does an openly acknowledged incarceration quota exist, 
much less dictate policy.271  The mandate continues in effect, and the Executive has 
not challenged it, instead calling for an increase in the funding of detention beds in 
the most recent budget.272  Family detention—the incarceration of migrant 
mothers together with their children—constitutes the largest percentage of 
the new detention beds.273  The protection from deportation that DAPA and ex-
panded DACA would offer to migrants who arrived prior to January 2010 would 
leave those who have arrived more recently, including the women and children 
who continue to arrive, as prime targets for these stronger nets of immigration 
enforcement in the form of family detention.274 
  
270. See Ted Robbins, Little-Known Immigration Mandate Keeps Detention Beds Full, NPR (Nov. 19, 
2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19/245968601/little-known-immigration-mandate-
keeps-detention-beds-full [http://perma.cc/7GCT-99W3] (“The mandate calls for filling 34,000 
beds in some 250 facilities across the country, per day, with immigrant detainees.”); see also Nick 
Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigration-detention-
boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html [http://perma.cc/Y6C5-
8J4S] (“The policy requires [ICE] to keep an average of 34,000 detainees per day in its custody, a 
quota that has steadily risen since it was established in 2006.”). 
271. See AILA’s Take on the Detention Bed Quota, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYER’S ASS’N (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.aila.org/infonet/ailas-take-on-the-detention-bed-quota [http://perma.cc/CC57-WS7 
P] (comparing other federal and local law enforcement agency detention policies to conclude that the 
ICE quota is “an aberration in law enforcement”); see also Eliminate the Detention Bed Quota, NAT’L 
IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., https://www.immigrantjustice.org/eliminate-detention-bed-quota 
[https://perma.cc/87TU-RAMH] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) (“No other law enforcement agency is 
subject to a statutory quota on the number of individuals to hold in detention.”); End the 
Immigration Detention Bed Quota, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, http://www.detentionwatch 
network.org/EndTheQuotaNarrative [https://web.archive.org/web/20150911015624/https://ww 
w.immigrantjustice.org/eliminate-detention-bed-quota#.Vov1yvkrJhE] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) 
(“[N]o other law enforcement agency operates on a quota system.”). 
272. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
58–60 (2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/budget.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/SFQ3-86P8] (the 2016 budget will increase funding for “additional technology 
and infrastructure, and expanding and enhancing intelligence and targeting capabilities,” as well as 
increase “the acquisition and sustainment of technology and tactical infrastructure along U.S. 
borders,” fund “recapitalization of aging non-intrusion inspection equipment and ports of entry,” and 
fund Customs and Border Protection (CBP) “intelligence and targeting activities”); see also Carly 
Perez, DWN Statement: Obama Budget Harms Immigrants by Funding Increased Detentions and 
Monitoring #EndtheQuota #ExposeandClose, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK (Feb. 3, 2015), http 
s://detentionwatchnetwork.wordpress.com/2015/02/03/dwn-statement-obama-budget-harms-
immigrants-by-funding-increased-detentions-and-monitoring-endthequota-exposeandclose 
[https://perma.cc/7DD8-PGMQ] (the new budget will “[b]ring the total number of detention beds 
to 34,040—40 beds above the congressionally-mandated detention bed quota.”). 
273. See Perez, supra note 272. 
274. Austin & Krisberg, supra note 31, at 169. 
Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm 649 
 
 
The Executive Actions also cement the ongoing expansion of Border Patrol 
resources, guaranteeing continued efforts to catch, detain, and remove those who 
are either initially attempting to enter the United States or trying to return to their 
families and communities post-deportation.275  As these examples demonstrate, 
even as lack of lawful status would be decriminalized for some in the form of 
DAPA and expanded DACA, the total required amount of immigration en-
forcement would remain the same or be exceeded and more vigorously directed 
toward those who do not qualify for the deferred action programs.  For those who 
cannot be made right with the law, the Executive Actions promise a stronger net 
in the form of bolstered mechanisms for their capture, detention, and deportation. 
C. The Executive Actions Create New Nets 
Net widening scholars also critique reforms that create new nets in the crim-
inal realm by transferring intervention authority from one agency or control sys-
tem to another one, rather than replacing or radically altering existing 
institutions.276  In the immigration context, this transfer of intervention authority 
had already been moving from federal immigration authorities to local criminal 
authorities, but the November 2014 Executive Actions bolstered this transfer.277  
The S-Comm program, now replaced by PEP, is part of what immigration 
scholar Hiroshi Motomura calls the “recent dramatic expansion of the state and 
local role in bringing removable noncitizens into contact with federal enforce-
ment.”278  With “criminal aliens” making up the largest percentage of removals, 
ICE relies heavily on noncitizens’ contact with local law enforcement to serve as 
the conduit to immigration detention and removal proceedings.279  Because most 
noncitizens transferred to ICE custody will be placed into removal (deportation) 
proceedings, ordered removed, and actually removed, Motomura posits that the 
“discretion that matters” is the discretion by local law enforcement to arrest.280  As 
  
275. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. on S. Border & 
Approaches Campaign, to R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Admiral 
Paul F. Zukunft, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., W. 
Craig Fugate, Adm’r, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency & Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Sec’y for 
Policy (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_south 
ern_border_campaign_plan.pdf [http://perma.cc/294C-3VC3] (extending previous programs by 
commissioning three joint task forces incorporating U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and USCIS). 
276. See Austin & Krisberg, supra note 31, at 169. 
277. Motomura, supra note 241, at 1858; see also Eagly, supra note 10. 
278. Motomura, supra note 241, at 1858. 
279. See Eagly, supra note 10, at 1128. 
280. Motomura, supra note 241, at 1853 (“The chances are very high that removable noncitizens 
arrested by federal officers will be put into civil removal, if not prosecuted criminally.  Once put into 
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Motomura explains, it is the “enforcement preferences and prejudices of state and 
local gatekeepers” that dictate the initial arrests of noncitizens, in turn defining 
which noncitizens end up deported.281 
Federal authorities tend to unquestioningly rely on the validity of local arrests 
and convictions, and this reliance tends to mask local law enforcement agents’ ra-
cial and ethnic preferences and prejudices (even as biases vary in severity from ju-
risdiction to jurisdiction).282  The very fact that a noncitizen’s introduction into the 
immigration enforcement apparatus occurs through the criminal system automat-
ically brands him a “criminal alien” for immigration purposes,283 a branding that 
helps obscure any shortcomings in the process of criminal arrest and prosecu-
tion.284   Under the original S-Comm program, a local arrest was sufficient for 
ICE to seek a noncitizen’s transfer.  The new Secure Communities Memo has 
clarified that only those noncitizens with convictions (not merely arrests) will be 
priorities for transfer to immigration custody.285  The reality remains, however, 
that convictions begin with arrests, and thus the “discretion that matters”286 con-
tinues to be the decision by local law enforcement to arrest.  As a result, immigra-
tion enforcement authority experiences a de facto transfer from federal to local 
hands, and local authorities choose who will be exposed to federal immigration 
enforcement. 
The Secure Communities Memo’s focus on convictions also consolidates 
the transfer of immigration enforcement authority to a new set of actors: local 
prosecutors.287  Particularly for those accused of misdemeanors (and who be-
come an immigration enforcement priority as a result of these charges), this 
transfer of power may prove less relevant, as arrests in the misdemeanor context 
  
civil removal, the chances are very high that they will be ordered and actually removed.”).  For a 
parallel discussion on how police officers’ discretion often determines outcomes in the misdemeanor 
adjudication system, and the effects of this discretion, see supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text. 
281. Motomura, supra note 241, at 1857. 
282. Id.  
283. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-187, CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS: 
INFORMATION ON INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS, AND COSTS 6 (2011) (defining “criminal aliens” 
as those noncitizens “who are residing in the United States legally or illegally and are convicted of a 
crime.”). 
284. For more discussion on how the harms of the immigration enforcement system are layered on top of 
the harms of the misdemeanor adjudication system, see supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
285. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 2 (“ICE should only seek the transfer of an alien in 
the custody of state or local law enforcement through the new program when the alien has been 
convicted of an offense listed in Priority 1 (a), (c), (d), and (e) and Priority 2 (a) and (b) of the 
November 20, 2014 [Priorities Memo], or when, in the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director, 
the alien otherwise poses a danger to national security.”). 
286. Motomura, supra note 241, at 1842. 
287. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 2.  
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translate into convictions at incredibly high rates.288  Nonetheless, ICE appears 
to be leaving nothing to chance: As Ingrid Eagly has revealed, ICE provides office-
wide trainings to local criminal prosecutors in counties with high noncitizen 
populations.289  The goal of these trainings is to have “local prosecutors properly 
charge and plead their criminal cases to maximize ICE’s chance of obtaining 
removal when desired.”290  With these trainings, ICE seeks to avoid “litigation 
challenges,” in which “ICE is unable to secure removal or the process of doing so 
is more cumbersome.”291  ICE retains the authority to detain and remove nonciti-
zens but relies on local actors to arrest and prosecute in ways that will indelibly 
mark a noncitizen as a “criminal alien.”  The Secure Communities Memo thus 
consolidates intervention authority in local jurisdictions, giving local police and 
prosecutors the power to both create and shape the nets that capture noncitizens. 
D. Disavowing Criminality Contributes to Net Widening 
An immigration reform strategy premised on distancing immigrants from 
criminality contributes to the net widening effects described in the above Subparts.  
Pro-immigrant advocacy commonly pushes back on the criminalization of immi-
grants by claiming and asserting respectability for immigrants—that is, in order 
to claim the right to be protected, immigrants are compelled to “discredit, disa-
vow, and deny the ‘criminal’ and/or ‘illegal’ populations within their communities 
to represent themselves fitting the ideals and standards of ‘respectability.’”292  In 
this case, to make the argument against S-Comm and in favor of immigrant 
rights, advocates represented immigrants “as worthy and deserving . . . and most 
important[ly], as not criminal.”293  As Lisa Marie Cacho explains, “Unfortunately, 
disavowing criminality or illegality does not challenge the logic of crime and pun-
ishment but actually strengthens, sustains, and substantiates it.  This logic 
leaves those who are most legally vulnerable in both communities with very few 
  
288. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 70, at 1328 (“Lacking evidentiary rigor and adversarial 
testing, it is a world in which a police officer’s bare decision to arrest can lead inexorably, and with 
little scrutiny, to a guilty plea.  It is, in other words, a world largely lacking in a scrutinized evidentiary 
basis for guilt, and therefore one in which the risk of wrongful conviction is high.”). 
289. See Eagly, supra note 10, at 1220 (“Within Los Angeles, Harris, and Maricopa Counties, ICE has 
begun to tailor its approach to the peculiarities of local practice.  In particular, public records requests 
reveal that ICE has conducted office wide trainings of prosecutors in each of the three county-level 
prosecution offices.”). 
290. Id. at 1220. 
291. Id. at 1221.  
292. Cacho, supra note 25, at 199.  According to Professor Lisa M. Cacho, “‘respectability’ functions as an 
ideological shorthand for the values, ethics, and attributes of a person residing in the United States, 
who deserves to be legally protected.”  Id. at 198 (emphasis omitted). 
293. Id. at 199. 
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allies.”294  With S-Comm, as with other aspects of immigration policy, the disa-
vowal of migrant criminality allows a response that widens the net, redefining ever 
more noncitizens as “criminal aliens” by crafting and consolidating new categories 
like the significant misdemeanor.  This pushes immigrants to perform ever more 
difficult feats of respectability, forcing them to avoid all negative contact with 
the criminal system, even when, particularly for low-income immigrants of col-
or, such avoidance may prove systemically impossible.295  For those who register 
for DAPA or expanded DACA, such a performance of respectability becomes 
more important than ever, given the required addition of their biometric infor-
mation to the immigration enforcement databases. 
The deployment of innocence—one of the hallmarks of the disavowal of 
criminality—in the efforts to argue for lawful status for immigrants who arrived 
in the United States as children has been broadly analyzed and critiqued.296  Less 
attention has been paid to the ways that innocence is used in the advocacy around 
ending police-ICE collaborations.  The arguments made against S-Comm, in-
cluding those that demanded reforms to the program because it targeted the 
wrong kind of immigrant, relied on a narrative of immigrants as guilty only of 
working hard to provide for their nuclear families.  The 2011 Immigration Policy 
Center’s report on S-Comm exemplified this type of argument when it recom-
mended that S-Comm “become a program that focuses solely on those immi-
grants who have been convicted of serious criminal offenses, or who have been 
identified by law enforcement officials to pose a threat to national security or pub-
lic safety.”297  This type of recommendation posits those without a criminal record 
or with a minor criminal record as innocents or near innocents who should not be 
swept up in an immigration apparatus that is viewed as targeting the wrong kind 
of immigrant.  This in turn requires the rejection of those who do face convictions 
after arrests, as well as those who are arrested for more serious offenses.298 
  
294. Id.  
295. For the proposition that racial profiling uniquely contributes to arrests of noncitizens, see Carbado & 
Harris, supra note 16 (comparing Terry v. Ohio and U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce to conclude that racial 
profiling is uniquely harmful when facilitated by civil immigration procedures). 
296. See, e.g., Daysi Diaz-Strong, Christina Gómez, María E. Luna-Duarte, Erica R. Meiners, & Luvia 
Valentin, Commentary: Organizing Tensions—From the Prison to the Military-Industrial Complex, 36 
SOC. JUST. 73, 74 (2010) (“Strategies for legalization offered by the state and embraced by many 
vulnerable communities, such as the DREAM Act, trade on tropes of ‘innocence’ and ‘merit,’ thus 
reinforcing the idea that there are ‘real’ criminals and undeserving or guilty immigrants who should 
legitimately be denied access to pathways for legalization.”). 
297. Waslin, supra note 115, at 17. 
298. Cacho, supra note 25, at 198 (With this type of argument, immigrants are “compelled to discredit, 
disavow, and deny the ‘criminal’ and/or ‘illegal’ populations within their communities to re-present 
themselves fitting the ideals and standards of ‘respectability.’”). 
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Separate from but related to the discourses of innocence were the calls to re-
ject S-Comm on the basis that the program supposedly threatened partnerships 
between immigrant communities and local law enforcement.299  This line of ad-
vocacy also draws on the idea that immigrants are not criminals, but rather, in-
nocents needing protection from the police.  A coalition of immigrant rights’ 
groups advocating for the Trust Act in California, the bill that limited S-Comm’s 
reach by limiting the use of ICE detainers,300 describes the need for the Trust 
Act in the following way: “With TRUST, immigrant crime victims and wit-
nesses will be able to come forward and cooperate with police without fear of 
deportation.  This will rebuild confidence in local law enforcement that’s been 
badly damaged by the ‘Secure’ Communities or S-Comm deportation dragnet.”301  
These sorts of statements draw on an image of a trusting relationship between 
the police and immigrant communities of color that purportedly previously ex-
isted and that S-Comm has negatively impacted.  The framing of the argument 
against S-Comm as one for a need for restored trust between unauthorized mi-
grant communities and the local police posits immigrants as those who are 
served by the police, not those who are targeted by the police, and frames them 
as respectable (non)citizens owed the state’s protection, not its sanction.  There 
is no doubt that knowledge of police-ICE collaboration renders encounters with 
local police even more frightening for low-income unauthorized immigrants of 
color.  Given the history of racial profiling and overpolicing of people of color, 
however, especially Black and Latino immigrants and queer and gender-non-
conforming immigrants of color, the call to a return to a time of healthy relation-
ships between police and communities may ring hollow for those who are tar-
geted by the police whether or not ICE is collaborating with them.302 
As described below, pushing for reforms that would focus enforcement 
on so-called dangerous criminals instead of innocent immigrants exempts 
  
299. See Waslin, supra note 115 (citing obstacles to community policing under S-Comm, which 
promoted the view among immigrant communities that local law enforcement is associated with 
immigration enforcement); see also Secure Communities, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statefed/SecureCommunitiesJuly2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/3DD 
5-HQ84] (last updated July 26, 2012) (“Opponents say [S-Comm] is detrimental to community 
policing goals which rely on the trust and support of community members to protect public 
safety.”); see also ICE’s “Secure Communities”: Washington State Communities Can’t Afford It, ONE 
AM. (2011), https://www.weareoneamerica.org/sites/weareoneamerica.org/files/SComm%20Fact 
%20Sheet%205%206%2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FLN-FWCB] (“‘Secure Communities’ hurts 
community policing initiatives by eroding trust between communities and local law enforcement.”). 
300. For an explanation of ICE detainers, see Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Secure 
Communities (SC) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP),  supra note 130. 
301. CAL. TRUST ACT, http://www.catrustact.org [https://perma.cc/L29K-K5ZT] (last visited Jan. 5, 
2016). 
302. See Carbado & Harris, supra note 16. 
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immigration enforcement practices from critique by making them isolatable to 
so-called real immigrant criminality.  This ends up shoring up both the crimi-
nal alien category and the problems with the criminal justice system itself. 
1. Disavowing Criminality Reinforces the “Criminal Alien” Category 
By relying on discourses of innocence, anti–S-Comm advocates inadvertent-
ly encouraged the sort of expansion of the criminal alien category, as well as en-
forcement based on this category, that both the Priorities Memo and the Secure 
Communities Memo promulgate.  Advocates released reports and studies that 
tracked ICE’s removal statistics and argued that many of those removed did not 
fall into the criminal alien category, but in doing so, these reports and studies 
reinforced the category as a viable and meaningful one.303  ICE’s expansion of 
the definition of “criminal alien” to include more categories of crimes is per-
versely sensible when viewed in light of this advocacy.  If the public relations 
problem with S-Comm includes the targeting of innocents or nearly innocents, 
then it is a logical response for DHS to clarify and codify immigrants whose 
criminal record consists of a DUI—one of the largest groups deported in recent 
years, and whom advocates posit as nearly innocents—as priority “criminal al-
iens.”304  This redefinition of an arguably innocent category into a categorically 
criminal one is precisely what occurred with the Secure Communities Memo. 
Beyond merely broadening the criminal alien category, the Secure Com-
munities Memo, like much of the 2014 Executive Actions, reinforced “crimi-
nal” as a category suitable for highly targeted and aggressive immigration 
enforcement efforts.  ICE will continue to gather the biometrics information of 
all noncitizens (and citizens, for that matter) at the point of arrest and will be 
able to act upon that information at their discretion.305  If ICE continues to tar-
get those who are arrested but not convicted, advocates may rightly continue to 
point out that ICE is not following its own directives.  Every time advocates do 
this, however, they will be reinforcing the legitimacy of an immigration en-
forcement apparatus organized around a merger with the criminal justice sys-
tem by engaging with the logic that a negative outcome for an immigrant in the 
criminal system (a conviction) is sufficient reason to detain and deport him.  
Ultimately, PEP represents a refined form of S-Comm: By clarifying that those 
subject to the program are truly criminal by ICE’s expanded definition, the 
  
303. See Waslin, supra note 115. 
304. See ICE Deportations: Gender, Age, and Country of Citizenship, supra note 76, at tbl.5 (citing that 
deportations for DUI numbered 32,463 in 2012 and 29,852 in 2013). 
305. Secure Communities Memo, supra note 29, at 2.  
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program is rendered less vulnerable to the advocacy efforts that rely on drawing 
a distinction between “innocent immigrants” and “criminal aliens.” 
By abandoning, at least in name, the overt rhetoric of creating secure 
communities but still relying heavily on the rhetoric of criminality that makes 
certain individuals a priority for enforcement, the new PEP makes it even more 
difficult to get at the underlying logics that can transform “innocent immi-
grants” into “criminal aliens.” Namely, the factors that contribute to an “inno-
cent immigrant” becoming a “criminal alien”—race, class, gender, and local 
policing practices, to name a few—are rendered invisible by ICE’s restated and 
refined focus on priority “criminal aliens” who have already been convicted.  
The ease by which an innocent immigrant can be transformed into a priority 
“criminal alien” upon conviction, and thus find herself beyond the reach of 
mainstream advocacy efforts, is also erased.  Ultimately, both ICE’s efforts and 
the respectability politics upon which they rely teach us how to abandon entire 
categories of people and end up strengthening, sustaining, and substantiating 
the logic of the criminal alien category.306 
2. Disavowing Criminality Shores Up the Criminal Justice System 
The unprecedented size of the U.S. carceral machinery has made its way 
into public consciousness.  Across the political spectrum, calls have been grow-
ing for the shrinking of the currently incarcerated population.307  The killing of 
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the killing of Eric Garner in New York 
City, New York, and the resulting nationwide protests have drawn attention to 
racially targeted policing and use of force.308  Yet, despite the connections be-
tween the immigration and criminal enforcement systems, the reforms that are 
beginning to be considered for policing and incarceration in the United States 
have not touched the immigration enforcement and detention apparatus.  If 
anything, narratives reinforcing immigrant criminality have become more 
  
306. See Cacho, supra note 25. 
307. See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, The Bipartisan Push for Criminal Justice Gets a Koch-Funded Boost, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/02 
/19/the-bipartisan-push-for-criminal-justice-gets-a-koch-funded-boost [http://perma.cc/CRJ7-
T8HK] (describing the launch of a new bipartisan coalition spanning from Tea Party Groups to 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Center for American Progress to fund criminal 
justice reform). 
308. See, e.g., J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer in 
Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyr 
egion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.ht 
ml [http://perma.cc/CF9D-6M8P] (highlighting protests throughout Washington, D.C., and 
New York in response to the refusal to indict Officer Pantaleo). 
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pervasive, as evinced by Obama’s repeated invocation of the “felons, not fami-
lies” catchphrase.309 
The announced reform to S-Comm whereby only those convicted will 
be the focus of enforcement needs to be considered side-by-side with cri-
tiques of the criminal justice system.  Criminal scholar Alexandra Natapoff’s 
work, cited in Part I.A, supra, has catalogued the dangers in assuming that 
misdemeanor convictions—the vast majority of criminal matters in the sys-
tem, and the basis for many S-Comm referrals—actually correspond with 
guilt.310  When anti–S-Comm advocates critiqued the program for sweeping 
up those who are arrested and not just focusing on those convicted, the con-
victions themselves were assigned weight and legitimacy in the criminal sys-
tem as reliable indicators of criminality for the immigration enforcement 
system—legitimacy that they did not merit.  Anti–S-Comm advocates’ call 
for detainer reform on the basis of restoring trust between police and immi-
grant communities masked the fact that police carry out arrests for reasons 
that have nothing to do with evidence and much to do with racial bias and 
other factors.311 
PEP, S-Comm’s replacement, relies on the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system, as “criminal aliens” are created by law enforcement and pros-
ecutors through local practices.  Believing in the potential effectiveness of PEP 
requires trusting that every step in the criminal process—arrests, bond deter-
minations, convictions (whether the result of a plea or a trial), and sentenc-
ing—is producing legitimate criminals for the immigration apparatus to detain 
and remove.  When advocates fight against S-Comm or PEP, and call for the 
program to only go after those convicted and not those arrested, they are like-
wise evoking trust in the criminal process, and in the legitimacy of the popula-
tion of prisoners it produces.  At a time when the criminal justice system faces 
a crisis of legitimacy, such a move is particularly problematic. 
  
309. President Barack Obama, supra note 2; see also Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24 
(“[W]e’ll keep focusing enforcement resources on actual threats to our security.  But that means 
felons, not families.”). 
310. See Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1064 (“Because the petty offense process rarely scrutinizes cases and 
because nearly everyone pleads guilty, arrests convert easily—in some places automatically—into 
convictions.  In other words, getting arrested, particularly for a minor urban disorder offense, can be 
tantamount to sustaining a criminal conviction.”). 
311. Id. at 1064.  (“Arrests for minor crimes are easily made with little or no evidentiary support.  This is 
especially true for urban quality-of-life offenses, which often take place in bulk as police strive to 
control high-crime neighborhoods.”). 
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III. EMBRACING THE “CRIMINAL ALIEN,” DISMANTLING THE 
CARCERAL STATE 
The Parts above have argued that rather than curb deportations, the 
November 2014 Executive Actions will result in the total amount of enforcement 
to either remain the same or increase.  Biometric databases will label every 
noncitizen as a potential “criminal alien,” and any noncitizen contact with local 
law enforcement will continue to lead to potential immigration enforcement ac-
tion.  For noncitizens, behavior like drunk driving will serve to permanently alter 
identity, turning an immigrant into a “criminal alien.”  These harms are layered 
on top of the shortcomings and dysfunctions of the criminal justice system, which 
will remain unaddressed in the push to mark more noncitizens as “criminal al-
iens” and deport them on this basis. 
The strategies for keeping immigrants out of the expanding criminal al-
ien category (and thus curbing deportations) have proven unsuccessful.  The 
pro-immigrant advocacy that led to the announcement of Executive Actions—
labeling the President as “Deporter-in-Chief,”312 demanding deferred action for 
all immigrants,313 and demanding an end to S-Comm314—ultimately resulted in a 
refinement of immigration enforcement that protects one portion of the undocu-
mented population even as it hypercriminalizes the rest.  In this sense, the Execu-
tive Actions can be considered a “conservative response to a radical challenge.”315  
The President’s “felons not families” rhetoric is only the most obvious symbol of 
the inherently conservative nature of the changes.316 
Advocacy that continues to distance immigrants from criminals as a re-
sponse to the criminalization of myriad aspects of the civil immigration sys-
tem will only lead to further refinements in enforcement such as those seen in 
the Executive Actions.  The transformation of the significant misdemeanor 
into a priority category for deportation and the metamorphosis of S-Comm 
into PEP only further clarify that appeals to the innocence and respectability 
of immigrants will not stop and may, on the contrary, enable DHS’s push to 
  
312. See Peralta, supra note 249. 
313. See Reshma Shamasunder, Deferred Action for All: A Common-Sense Step to Honor Immigrants’ 
Contributions, HUFF. POST BLOG (Sept. 10, 2014, 7:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
reshma-shamasunder/deferred-action-for-all-a_b_5798562.html [http://perma.cc/VM34-SNR 
R] (calling for an extension of deferred action to “all of California’s 2.6 million undocumented 
residents—and to undocumented immigrants across the nation . . . .”). 
314. See Alvarado, supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
315. Natapoff, supra note 64, at 1109. 
316. See Nov. 21, 2014 Obama Remarks, supra note 24. 
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broaden and cement categories of migrant criminality.317  Reforms like those 
proposed by the Executive Actions that ground their logic in immigrant crimi-
nality are fated to continue to expand and strengthen “criminal alien” as a suitable 
marker of disposable immigrant lives. 
To avoid future cycles of refinement and expansion of immigration en-
forcement efforts, a new direction is needed.  The remainder of this Article offers 
three proposals to guide scholarship and advocacy in order to curb detention and 
deportation distributed along the lines of migrant criminality. 
A. Embrace and Defend the “Criminal Alien” 
The criminalization of migration has reached the point where the de 
facto position for unauthorized migrants, particularly the 6.7 million who en-
tered without inspection, is that of “criminal alien” until proven otherwise.318  
Because immigration enforcement practices center on detaining and deport-
ing an ever-widening swath of people defined as “criminal aliens,” it seems 
logical that scholars and advocates ought to push back by attacking the corre-
lation between migration and criminality.319  However, instead of mounting a 
  
317. For a full discussion of the Executive Actions’ changes, see supra Parts I.A and I.B. 
318. Motomura, supra note 241, at 1828 (“[A]bout 6.7 million unauthorized migrants . . . are believed to 
have entered without inspection at a port of entry.”); see also Eagly, supra note 10, at 1128 (finding 
that the “deportation of ‘criminal aliens’ is now the driving force in American immigration 
enforcement.”).  Eagly is careful to point out that “not all noncitizens who are removed are 
criminals.”  Id. at 1128–29 n.9.  This Article argues that the construction of immigrants as criminals 
renders all noncitizens presumptive “criminal aliens” unless they can prove that they merit 
prosecutorial discretion.  The burden is on the noncitizen to prove worthiness, not on the immigration 
enforcement system to prove criminality.  
319. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National 
Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007) (arguing that blurred boundaries between immigration 
policy, crime control, and national security have improperly subsumed the original impetus for each 
sector); see also Matthew T. Lee, Ramiro Martinez, Jr. & Richard Rosenfeld, Does Immigration 
Increase Homicide? Negative Evidence from Three Border Cities, 42 SOC. Q. 559, 560, 571–74 (2001) 
(concluding that there is no correlation between recent immigration and higher crime rates); Rubén 
G. Rumbaut, Roberto G. Gonzales, Golnaz Komaie & Charlie V. Morgan, Debunking the Myth of 
Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First-and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST. (June 1, 2006), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/debunking-myth-immigrant-
criminality-imprisonment-among-first-and-second-generation-young [http://perma.cc/7YGZ-JT 
4G] (“Paradoxically, incarceration rates are lowest among immigrant young men, even among the 
least educated and the least acculturated among them, but they increase sharply among the U.S. born 
and acculturated second generation . . . .”); Rubén G. Rumbaut & Walter A. Ewing, The Myth of 
Immigrant Criminality and the Paradox of Assimilation, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Feb. 21, 2007), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/myth-immigrant-criminality-and-paradox-
assimilation [http://perma.cc/EX59-WK4L] (“In fact, data from the census and other sources show 
that for every ethnic group without exception, incarceration rates among young men are lowest for 
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seemingly never-ending series of defenses against the myth of migrant crimi-
nality (the idea that immigration enforcement on the basis of the criminal al-
ien category is justified in part by the criminal tendencies of noncitizens as a 
group), scholars and advocates would do well to begin to mount an unabashed 
defense of the “criminal alien.”320  Defending against migrant criminality on 
the grounds that immigrants are not criminals merely invites immigration au-
thorities to expand the category of the criminal alien, to justify the current 
record levels of deportations.  Reforms that move the power to punish, detain, 
and deport around from one government actor or agency to another and justi-
fy the transfer on the basis of contact with the criminal system do the same.  
Releasing the grip on narratives of deserving and undeserving immigrants and 
mounting a full defense of the “criminal alien” would allow for more nuanced 
advocacy and scholarship.  A defense of the “criminal alien” should not be 
based on the category being overbroad or on immigration being a civil, not a 
criminal wrong.  The category is too well established for those arguments to 
result in broad-based pro-immigrant reforms.  Instead, an embrace of the 
“criminal alien” requires challenging the very formulation of the category and 
revealing it as an unnatural classification for the distribution of the harms of 
detention and deportation.  It also requires a critique of the system that pro-
duces migrants—primarily poor migrants of color from the Global South—as 
criminals.321 
B. Examine Immigration Enforcement Within the Totality of the U.S. 
Criminal Justice System 
Instead of exceptionalizing the criminalization of immigrants, advocates 
and scholars should practice engaging in what Dylan Rodriguez calls the “diffi-
cult praxis of conceptualizing immigration detention within the organic logic of 
the totality of U.S. carceral state violence.”322  Scholars have already begun the 
  
immigrants, even those who are the least educated.  This holds true especially for the Mexicans, 
Salvadorans, and Guatemalans who make up the bulk of the undocumented population.”). 
320. This would admittedly be a departure from current practice.  University of California Davis (UC 
Davis) School of Law Dean Kevin R. Johnson points out that “the ‘criminal alien’ continues to be 
one of the most reviled characters of all of U.S. law, with many enemies and extremely few political 
friends (even among immigrant rights advocates).”  Johnson, supra note 14, at 1607. 
321. Kevin R. Johnson, Dean of UC Davis School of Law, summarizes the distribution of immigration 
harms along the lines of race, class, and country of origin in The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. 
Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009). 
322. Dylan Rodríguez, “I Would Wish Death on You…” Race, Gender, and Immigration in the Globality of the 
U.S. Prison Regime, SCHOLAR & FEMINIST ONLINE (2008), http://www.ethnicstudies.ucr.edu/ 
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work of mapping out the ways in which immigration has been criminalized and 
how aspects of the immigration system have been injected into the criminal 
justice system.323  Scholars and advocates should go a step further and consist-
ently conceptualize the totality of immigration enforcement practices, including 
arrests, detentions, and exercises of prosecutorial discretion (such as deferred 
action) within the framework of the criminal justice system.324 
The anti-prison movement is gaining ground as the crises in the practices 
of policing, processing, and incarcerating individuals come into ever-sharper re-
lief.325  Immigration scholars and advocates avoid anti-prison and anti-police 
brutality scholarship and social movements at their peril, given how immigra-
tion has been inextricably entwined with the criminal system.  At best, this 
omission risks defining the problems facing immigrants so narrowly as to pro-
duce reforms that change little and simultaneously reinforce migrant criminality.  
At worst, it threatens to undermine anti-prison and anti-police brutality move-
ments by bolstering the logic of criminality in general.  Analyzing immigration 
  
publications_media/rodriguez/SCHOLAR_AND_FEMINIST_ONLINE.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
QSL6-YCH4]. 
323. The burgeoning “crimmigration” field has already begun this labor.  The work of Juliet Stumpf, 
Jennifer Chacón, César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, and many others has vastly expanded the 
analysis of the growing links between the criminal and immigration systems.  See, e.g., DANIEL 
KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007); Jennifer 
M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009); 
Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1749 (2011); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281–83, 1353 
fig.4 (2010); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-
September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 654–55 (2004); see also García 
Hernández, supra note 66; Legomsky, supra note 12; Miller, supra note 13; Stumpf, supra note 57. 
324. The work of Ingrid Eagly, Jason Cade, and Hiroshi Motomura exemplifies this approach.  See, e.g., 
Cade, supra note 75; Eagly, supra note 10; Motomura, supra note 241. 
325. The recent announcement of a partnership between the right-leaning Koch Brothers and left-
leaning George Soros, among others, illustrates this trend.  See Carl Hulse, Unlikely Cause Unites the 
Left and the Right: Justice Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/ 
19/us/politics/unlikely-cause-unites-the-left-and-the-right-justice-reform.html [http://perma.cc/D 
5MH-R334].  While the momentum is growing, longtime anti-prison scholars and activists are 
issuing warnings about the direction of criminal justice reform.  See Ruth Gilmore, The Worrying 
State of the Anti-Prison Movement, SOC. JUST. (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/? 
p=2888 [http://perma.cc/5JHN-U3AP].  Whatever the direction of the movement, immigration 
scholars and advocates, with few exceptions, have remained peripheral to it.  One exception is the 
New York-based Families for Freedom, an organization run by individuals directly affected by 
deportation.  See, e.g., Abraham Paulos, U.S. Criminal Deportations and the Future of Black 
Immigrants, HUFF. POST BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015, 3:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/abraha 
m-paulos/us-criminal-deportations-_b_6763282.html [http://perma.cc/3F7F-XFFT] (“[W]e may 
question why is it that there exists a false distinction between criminal justice reform movement, 
racial justice and immigrant rights despite that many of us suffer injustices through our lived 
experiences as Black bodies.  The domestic and global systems of oppression do not entertain such 
distinctions and neither should we.”). 
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enforcement within the context of the broader carceral state not only helps 
expose the shortcomings in reform strategies that give further reach and 
weight to the criminal alien category, but also helps provide an opening to 
produce both scholarship and advocacy that generate viable alternatives to the 
current criminal justice system. 
C. Assess Proposed Reforms by Whether They Bolster the Detention and 
Deportation of “Criminal Aliens” 
With any proposed reform on the immigration front (from a local campaign 
to a new law to an expansion of the Executive Actions), scholars and advocates 
must ask whether the reform increases harm against those labeled “criminal al-
iens.”326  This question must include an inquiry into whether the category of 
criminal alien itself is expanded or reinforced by the suggested reform.  A full 
defense of the “criminal alien” demands this focus on how reforms impact the 
most criminalized migrants in order to dismantle the harms distributed by the 
criminal alien category.  This requires flipping the usual script.  Current ad-
vocacy and scholarship often argue for the worthy or not (yet) criminalized 
immigrants to be spared the harms of detention and deportation, and to be 
given a pathway to citizenship.327  The focus in this type of intervention seems 
to be on placing immigrants on the documented side of the undocumented-
documented divide.328  Advocacy and scholarship that prioritize a defense of 
the “criminal alien” should instead aim to disturb the notion that immigrant 
enforcement should be based on contact with the criminal system.  This type 
of advocacy’s focus should be to reduce the harms of criminality by interrupt-
ing and dismantling the mechanisms that lead to unauthorized migrants’ de-
tention and deportation.329 
  
326. For a full discussion on this guiding principle, see Angélica Cházaro, Beyond Respectability: 
Dismantling the Harms of Illegality, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355 (2015). 
327. See, e.g., Stephen W. Bender, Compassionate Immigration Reform, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 107, 122 
(2010) (“Conditions such as learning English should be replaced by an unfettered pathway to 
citizenship that aims to successfully and respectfully integrate undocumented immigrants into the 
political, economic, and social fabric of our communities.”); see also Gilbert, supra note 35, at 310 (“If 
DACA serves as a stepping stone to passage of the DREAM Act and comprehensive immigration 
reform, then this bold assertion of Executive authority will have lasting impact.”); Johnson, supra 
note 14, at 1621 (“For reasons of fairness, the legalization, or regularization of the immigration 
status, of undocumented immigrants has long been a priority of the advocates of immigrants.”). 
328. See Cházaro, supra note 326. 
329. These mechanisms include local policing practices and programs like S-Comm. 
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D. Embrace the “Criminal Alien” in Practice 
Advocacy efforts to disarm the category of criminal alien, while nascent, have 
begun.  They emerged in the most unexpected of settings during the 2012 reau-
thorization of the Violence Against Women Act.  As part of the reauthorization, 
Congress tried (and failed) to insert language expanding the aggravated felony cat-
egory—which leads to almost guaranteed deportation—to include those persons 
who had three or more DUI convictions.330  Domestic violence advocates, a group 
usually characterized as willing partners of the criminal justice system, rejected ex-
panding a criminal alien category in the name of protecting women from vio-
lence.331  They actively lobbied against the creation of a new DUI-based aggravated 
felony, and in their congressional lobbying efforts presented talking points that re-
jected this development.332  This successful effort was surprising in part because it 
pulled away from the role typically assigned to contemporary domestic violence 
advocates.333  Their rejection of the expansion of the criminal alien category was 
especially notable as a moment in which people who were invited to be part of the 
expansion of the criminal justice system and its ties to the immigration system re-
fused the invitation. 
These efforts are also emerging organically from those who have the most to 
lose—immigrants who are already imprisoned in detention centers.  In March 
2014, 1200 immigrants held in a Tacoma, Washington immigration detention 
  
330. See S. REP. NO.112-153, at 35 (2012) (attempting to add habitual drunk driving to the list of 
aggravated felonies for deportation in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)). 
331. See, e.g., Oppose Grassley Amendment (MDM12037) to the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization 
(S. 1925) Regarding Removal of Drunk Drivers, NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
(Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/NTFESDVAW_TalkingPointsVAWADrunkDriv 
ingAmendment_2-17-2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/C6ZG-K85Q] (“Senator Grassley’s Amendment 
to S. 1925, elevating a third drunk driving conviction to the status of an aggravated felony for the 
purposes of immigration removal, does not belong in VAWA.”); see also National Sign-On Letter 
Opposing Third DUI Resulting in an Aggravated Felony, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS’N (Feb. 4, 
2013), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-correspondence/2013/let ter-opposing-third-dui-resul 
ting-in-felony [http://perma.cc/RZF4-AZME] (urging Congress to reject Grassley’s amendment 
to VAWA: “The amendment attempts to use VAWA as a back door to address other immigration 
matters that are irrelevant to the focus of VAWA, thus threatening to undermine the integrity and 
purpose of VAWA.”). 
332. See Eliminate the Detention Bed Quota, supra note 271; National Sign-On Letter Opposing Third DUI 
Resulting in an Aggravated Felony, supra note 331. 
333. BETH RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA'S PRISON 
NATION 83 (2012) (describing the centrality of criminal justice strategies to the contemporary 
domestic violence movement and explaining that “[t]he subsequent over-reliance on the criminal 
legal system and law enforcement strategies, and on legal and legislative reform more broadly, as the 
solutions to the problem of violence against women, solidified ultimately into one of the most 
important dimensions of the anti-violence movement’s work . . . .”). 
Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm 663 
 
 
center began a 56-day hunger strike.334  The group of hunger strikers included a 
mix of long-time Lawful Permanent Residents with serious criminal records, re-
cent arrivals seeking asylum, and long-term undocumented residents whose road 
to detention had begun with a single DUI.335  They made broad-based demands, 
from improvements in their conditions of confinement to an end to all deporta-
tions, all without drawing distinctions between their worthiness for such changes 
on the basis of their respective criminal records.336  The detention facility encour-
ages inmates to fear each other by color-coding their dress.337  At the time of the 
hunger strike, detainees were dressed in blue, orange, or red depending on their 
level of perceived dangerousness, based loosely on their criminal records.  Their 
housing also depends on their outfit color, with more purportedly dangerous de-
tainees housed in separate sections of the prison.338  Despite these external imposi-
tions of alleged levels of criminality, long-time Lawful Permanent Residents stood 
  
334. Alexis Krell, Hunger Strike at Tacoma’s Immigration Detention Center Enters Day 4, NEWS TRIBUNE 
(Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.thenewstribune.com/2014/03/10/3089804/hunger-strike-at-tacomas-
immigration.html [http://perma.cc/PG5J-NDXY] (documenting a hunger strike at the Northwest 
Detention Center “in protest of deportations, in demand of better food, [and better] treatment by 
guards and working conditions at the center.”). 
335. See Alex Altman, Prison Hunger Strike Puts Spotlight on Immigration Detention, TIME (Mar. 17, 
2014), http://time.com/27663/prison-hunger-strike-spotlights-on-immigration-detention [http:// 
perma.cc/XR2B-P7ZG] (In addition to an individual immigration detainee who protested his own 
detention, hundreds of protestors who followed suit “in Tacoma were also reacting to the policy 
known as mandatory detention, which often locks up offenders indefinitely.  The policy was 
expanded by a pair of laws passed in 1996 and strengthened by the Patriot Act after Sept. 11, 2001.  
It requires that categories of non-U.S. citizens be imprisoned without evaluating the threat they may 
pose, often without giving them a bond hearing.”); see also Kristen Millares Young, Migrant 
Detainees at Washington State Centre Continue Protesting Conditions, GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/12/immigration-detainees-washington-state-
center-protest-conditions [http://perma.cc/PBG5-GLYD] (documenting family member protests 
outside the gates of the Northwest Detention Facility in Tacoma, Washington). 
336. See Max Blumenthal, Why Immigrant Detainees are Turning to Civil Disobedience, NATION (May 23, 
2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/179987/why-immigrant-detainees-are-turning-civil-diso 
bedience [http://perma.cc/G9JK-43E9] (“As the national media focused in on Tacoma, Mora 
Villalpando and two local immigration lawyers attempted to initiate negotiations with ICE.  Their 
demands were drawn up by the hunger strikers: an end to the indefinite waits for hearings, the 
solitary confinement regime, the medical deprivation and the callous and arbitrary separation of 
families.  Instead of negotiations, they were met with an iron-fisted crackdown.”). 
337. Angélica Cházaro, Rolling Back the Tide: Challenging the Criminalization of Immigrants in Washington 
State, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 127, 134 (2012).  Descriptions of detention center conditions 
are based on Cházaro’s own observations.  For more information about human rights issues at the 
Northwest Detention Center, see SEATTLE U. SCH. OF LAW INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, 
VOICES FROM DETENTION: A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS AT THE 
NORTHWEST DETENTION CENTER IN TACOMA 5 (2008), http://www.weareoneamerica.org/sit 
es/default/files/OneAmerica_Detention_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/HFR2-HXH4]. 
338. See ICE, ICE/DRO DETENTION STANDARD CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM at 3 (2008), http:// 
www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/classification_system.pdf. [http://perma.cc/XU6 
U-65YA]. 
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side by side with recent arrivals, and those with criminal records stood by those 
without, jointly facing solitary confinement and other threats to collectively and 
collaboratively draw attention to their common conditions.339  Their refusal of the 
invitations to abandon each other on the basis of their different levels of criminali-
ty provides an example for all pro-immigrant scholars and advocates. 
Additionally, when examining immigration enforcement within the totality 
of the criminal justice system, separate opportunities emerge.  If advocates are in-
terested in attacking the significant misdemeanor category and other categories 
that lead to detention and deportation, then joining efforts may contribute greatly 
to dismantling the jail-to-deportation pipeline for noncitizens.  For example, ad-
vocates could collaborate to decriminalize property crimes and to recategorize drug 
and alcohol use as part of public health crises rather than as reasons for arrest and 
criminal prosecution.  Likewise, advocacy efforts to end racist policing may be 
more effective in curbing deportations than further refinements to the new version 
of S-Comm, rebranded as PEP, as getting booked and fingerprinted by local police 
is the first step on the road to detention and deportation.  In sum, pro-immigrant 
scholars and advocates must commit fully to efforts to address the excesses of the 
criminal system.  This only becomes possible if “criminal aliens” become a group to 
rally around and defend, not a group to differentiate from and reject. 
CONCLUSION 
The specter of the “criminal alien” haunts all aspects of the November 2014 
Immigration Executive Actions; the accepted tenet that immigration enforcement 
should be distributed along the lines of migrant criminality leads to the criminal 
alien category becoming ever broader, with more noncitizens subjected to the 
harms of detention and deportation.  At the same time, the criminal justice sys-
tem—the same system that helps produce “criminal aliens” for the immigration 
enforcement agencies—faces a crisis of legitimacy over both mass incarceration 
and policing practices.  Scholars and advocates interested in halting the unprece-
dented rates of immigrant detention and deportation should accept the oppor-
tunity offered by the crisis of legitimacy in the criminal justice system and create a 
crisis for the “criminal alien” paradigm, rejecting a deportation regime premised 
on migrant criminality.  Only by rejecting the “criminal alien” paradigm will op-
portunities emerge to avoid future executive actions and legislative reforms that in-
crease harm for unauthorized migrants. 
  
339. See Interview with Sandy Restrepo, Attorney (01/15/2015) (regarding her representation of hunger-
striking detainees).  This information is also based on the Author’s experience representing detainees 
during the hunger strike, alongside attorney Sandy Restrepo. 
